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THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD POLICY
FAVORING SUBSIDY REDUCTION TO LOCAL SERVICE
CARRIERS: ITS ROLE AND IMPLEMENTATION
IN THE DECISIONAL PROCESS*
By
I.

S INCE

BARRE HALLt
INTRODUCTION

A. Introduction To The Topic

ITS formation in 1946' the local service airline industry has
experienced a rapid rate of growth, recently surpassing even that of
the domestic trunkline industry, and showing large absolute increases in
revenue passenger-miles flown since 1960.' The continuation of this trend
in recent years, with commensurate increases in gross revenue, has raised
the hopes both of the Civil Aeronautics Board ("CAB" or "Board") and
many local service carriers of eliminating the subsidy program which has
characterized the industry since its inception.' The industry paradox of
sustained dynamic growth with continued subsidized operations spot-

lights the importance of future Board decisions in charting a course which
will further encourage the growth and development of the local service
industry but at the same time deal with the problem of subsidy payment.
1. Statement of Purpose

CAB policy is implemented, to a large degree, through the decisional
process. The reason for this is that the authority to make a decision provides the Board with a unique opportunity to realize policy objectives.
It is able to utilize this power to render a decision consistent with its policy
objectives.
It will subsequently be demonstrated that the CAB has adopted a policy
of reducing the subsidy requirements for local service carriers. The mere
adoption of such a subsidy reduction policy, however, does not mean that
the Board is necessarily effectuating it. This thesis will be concerned with
determining the extent to which the Board is effectuating its policy of sub*Submitted in partial fulfillment for the requirements of the LL.M. degree at Northwestern
University School of Law.
t B.Sc., LL.B., University of Manitoba; LL.M., Northwestern University; member of the Manitoba Bar. The author is extremely indebted to Professor Jay Hillman of Northwestern University
School of Law for his patience, guiding comments, and criticism which have contributed greatly
to this paper.
' Service in Rocky Mountain States Area, 6 C.A.B. 695, 741-42 (1946).
2 1954 C.A.B. Ann. Rep. 45; 1966 C.A.B. Ann. Rep. 92; CAB, Bureau of Accounts and Statistics (Costs and Statistics Division) AIR CARRIER TRAFFIC STATISTICS, June 30, 1967; CAB,
Bureau of Accounts and Statistics (Costs and Statistics Division) AIR CARRIER TRAFFIC STATISTICS,
March 31, 1967.
a Hearings on the Local Air Carrier Industry Before the Aviation Sub-Committee of the House
Committee on Commerce, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 89-62, at 28-50, 121-76 (1966). [Hereafter
cited as Hearings on the Local Air Carrier Industry.]
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sidy reduction through its decisional process. Or, stated another way, the
object may be said to be to determine the extent and manner of policy
guidance in resolving alternative possibilities in each proceeding. However
stated, it is the effect of the Board's subsidy reduction policy upon the
Board's decisional process which will be examined herein.
2. Theoretical Framework
The first requisite for the analysis herein is the detection and determination of the CAB policy favoring subsidy reduction for the local service
carriers, as well as its approximate date of adoption by the Board. In satisfaction of this element the various media commonly used to express policy
will be examined. Such sources as annual reports to Congress, other reports,
speeches, hearings, press releases and regularized publications such as codified regulations will be relied upon.
Having detected and defined the requisite policy, attention will be
directed to the decisional process. The decisional process of the Board
encompasses such diverse areas as fares and fare structure, certification of
carriers to provide service (i.e., entry, exit and points served), various
business relationships including stock ownership, interlocking relationships, consolidation, mergers and acquisitions, and accounts, records and
reports." The Board has, however, as will be demonstrated, selected primarily the areas of merger' and route certification as the most useful areas
for the effectuation of its policy of subsidy reduction.' This selection
appears to be quite sensible, on its face, since both areas present substantial
opportunity for financial improvement of local carriers (and concomitant
lessened subsidy requirements). Mergers are capable of increasing efficiency
of local carriers and generating more traffic; route certifications can do
likewise. Because the merger and route certification areas are the primary
recipients of Board attention when it comes to the effectuation of subsidy
reduction policy, it is these areas which will bear analysis in determining
whether the Board is effectuating its policy of subsidy reduction through
its decisional process. In this connection the following questions will be
posed. Can it be shown that the subsidy reduction policy has been a
material factor in the Board's decisions regarding merger application and
route certification? If so, how? If not, why not?
In brief, this thesis will focus specifically on whether the Board is
effectuating its policy of subsidy reduction for local carriers in its decisions
regarding mergers and route certifications. In pursuing this objective pertinent local carrier merger decisions of the Board will be analyzed. Having
established the adoption of a CAB policy favoring subsidy reduction for
local service carriers, attention will be directed to those decisions rendered
prior to the adoption by the Board of its subsidy reduction policy which
will be examined first. Then, decisions rendered subsequent to the policy
4

Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §§ 401-13, 72 Stat. 754-70, 49 U.S.C. §5 1371-83 (1964).
"Merger"
as used here, refers also to acquisitions and consolidations. Essentially, these three
forms of amalgamation of corporate enterprise will be treated in the same fashion in this analysis.
However, it will be noted, where relevant, which form of amalgamation is being considered.
. See Hearings.on the Local Air Carrier Industry, sutpra note 3, at 35-36, 50.
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will be examined' to detect, through any shift in emphasis by the Board
in its rationales, whether or not the subsidy reduction policy has served to
shape the subsequent merger decisions, or whether or not it can in fact
be concluded that the Board policy of subsidy reduction has had a discernible effect upon the Board's decisional process.8
.-In the case of route certification it will be demonstrated that the Board
has developed a comprehensive program termed "systems realignment"'
designed to implement its program of subsidy reduction in route certification cases. This program is composed of several component programs, the
most significant of which is the "dense route certification" program. It is
sufficient to note at this point that various approaches will be taken to all
component programs to determine whether the Board is effectuating its
policy of subsidy reduction through each particular program and thereby
having an effect upon its decisional process. The dense route certification
program will be the exception. To determine the effect of the policy of
subsidy reduction on it, the Board dense route certification decision decided
prior to the program will first be analyzed. In this connection decisions
rendered both prior and subsequent to the Board's adoption of its subsidy
reduction policy will be examined. Then, Board decisions rendered subsequent to the dense route certification program will be analyzed. The object
of these analyses will be to detect any shift in emphasis by the Board in
its decisions, which would indicate that the policy of subsidy reduction
has had a discernible effect upon the Board's process with respect to dense
route certification cases.
3. A Brief Considerationof the Nature and Significance of Board Policy
Several cogent reasons exist for briefly considering the nature and significance of Board policy. First, a basic understanding of the role of policy
is useful as general background for the analysis attempted herein. Second,
such an understanding will prove helpful in detecting and defining Board
policy. Finally, it is important for the purpose of determining, with maximum accuracy, the effect of Board policy upon the decisional process.
Policy can be formulated both by Congress and by the various federal
agencies such as the CAB. Policy formed by Congress can take two forms.
The first is a general statement of policy intended to provide only general
objectives and guidelines for the Board. Section 1302 of the Federal
Aviation Act provides an example of such general policy." The second
'No merger applications were heard or decided by the Board in the period commencing with
the adoption of the subsidy reduction policy by the Board, on or about 5 April 1962, and ending
with the predisposition involving the favoring of local carrier mergers, on or about 28 Feb.
1966.
s It can safely be stated that if the rationale of a merger decision, rendered by the Board (or
route certification decision for that matter) is partially or totally based upon a desire by the Board
to effectuate its own policy of subsidy reduction, then the Board has effectuated its policy of subsidy reduction through the decisional process. Only the occasional decision is based upon the consideration of one factor such as subsidy reduction. Most cases involve more. However, even where
subsidy reduction is only one factor considered in a decision it can still be a material one, although,

the actual weight accorded it will likely be difficult to determine unless the Board specifically
comments in that regard.
9 See 1966 C.A.B. Ann. Rep. at 3-8.

is In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties under this Act, the Board shall con-
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form is a more specific, but not necessarily definitive, statement. An example is provided by the requirement of consistency with the "public interest," inter alia, for merger application approval as set out in Section
1378(b) of the Act."
When policy is formulated at the agency level by the Board it is done
so by agreement of at least a majority of Board members, usually at the
conclusion of a thorough examination of the area involved. When formulating its own policy the Board will rely heavily upon the general objectives and guidelines set forth by Congress in the declaration of policy
contained in section 1302 of the Federal Aviation Act. The general objectives and guidelines are thus instrumental in providing direction for Board
policies.
On occasion the President brings the great weight and responsibility of
his office to bear upon the Board in requesting the Board to adopt a particular policy. The Board need not comply with the request, but it may well
choose to do so. This is a second method of Board policy formation. It
has occurred in the last few years and will be the subject of some discussion at a later point in this analysis.
Policy formulated by the Board is not invariably obvious to all concerned. It may be expressed in at least three ways: 12 a) as principle to be
extracted from decisions in a case by case approach, b) as a rule or regulation promulgated by the Board, and c) as an overt statement of policy
appearing in a speech, hearing, annual report, or press release. The latter
two methods of policy expression must be regarded as two variations on
the same theme, namely, formal pronouncement of policy. The significant distinction between a rule or regulation and an overt statement of
policy derives from the methods of publication employed, the former
appearing in regularized publication such as the Federal Register and the
Code of Federal Regulations, and the latter appearing more or less spontaneously, in speeches, press releases, hearings, and annual reports."
sider the following, among other things, as being in the public interest, and in accordance with
the public convenience and necessity:
(a) The encouragement and development of an air transportation system properly adapted to
the present and future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the
Postal Service, and of the national defense;
(b) The regulation of air transportation in such a manner as to recognize and preserve the
inherent advantages of, assure the highest degree of safety in, and foster sound economic conditions
in, such transportation, and improve the relations between, and coordinate transportation by air
carriers;
(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service by air carriers at reasonable
charges, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive
competitive practices;
(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of an air transportation system properly adapted to the needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United
States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense;
(e) The promotion of safety in air commerce; and
(f) The promotion, encouragement and development of civil aeronautics.
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 102, 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1964).
"' Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 408(b), 72 Stat. 763, as amended, 74 Stat. 901, 49 U.S.C. 5
1378(b) (1964).
12

U.S. ATT'Y GENERAL'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT-ADMININ GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. 21 (1941).

ISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

" See for example the Board regulation concerning names of air carriers and foreign air carriers
set out in the Code of Federal Regulations, 14 C.F.R. S 215 (1967). Contrast this with the CAB's
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No CAB policy of subsidy reduction for local service carriers has been
announced in regularized publications. Therefore, to establish its adoption,
resort will be necessary to annual reports, speeches, press releases, other
reports, etc. for its detection and definition.
Policy plays an important role in the functioning of federal administrative agencies. This holds especially true in the case of the Civil Aeronautics
Board." The importance of policy to the CAB becomes evident upon considering the problems which arise in the Board's adjudicative process in the
absence of guiding policy.
Overt stated Board policy serves as a guide to the Board in pointing the
general direction for it to aim in its decisions. Without developing its own
policy it would be very difficult for the Board to define and clarify the
very general policy dictated to it by Congress in the Federal Aviation
Act."1 The absence of stated Board policy would likely cause a retrogression
to the evolution of policy on a case by case basis as a result of the vacuum
which the absence of stated policy creates in the policy development area.
Historically, this was the main method of policy development.' 6 The case
by case approach to policy formation would be a step backward since it
is slow, accidental in character, permeated with potential hazards, and
capable of maintaining conflicting standards."
On the positive side, Judge Friendly has prepared a "miscellany of intraagency advantages" favoring the enunciation of policy by the Board."
His list includes educating Board members, reducing the volume of cases,
prevention of periods of drift by the Board, decreasing the number of
appeals, facilitating delegation to subordinates, and reducing expenses and
delay. Clearly, then, policy enunciation plays an important role in the
Board's functioning and can have important and far-reaching advantages.
The foregoing discussion of Board policy has similar application to other
federal agencies.
The CAB makes use of a "hearing examiner" to hear various air carrier
applications and make recommendations to the Board based upon its own
objective findings in light of the statutory requirements. The use of an
examiner can result in more efficient functioning by the Board. Efficiency
improves when the examiner successfully "pre-digests" a case for the Board
because a great deal of the Board's time is saved by the examiner's hearing
and decision. However, to reach decisions acceptable to the Board the
examiner must be attuned to the Board's general thinking on any particular matter. The best way to achieve this is by the enunciation of general
policy by the Board. This would allow the examiner the correct frame of
announcement of its systems realignment program in its annual report for fiscal 1966. 1966 C.A.B.
Ann. Rep. at 4.
14 "The most important responsibility of an economic regulatory agency such as the CAB is the
formulation of broad plans and general policies . .
. This is more important than the decision
of specific litigated cases." Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69 YALE L.J. 931 (1960).
is H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFINITION
OFl STANDARDS.
14 (1962).
6
1 d. at 143.
'lid. at 143-45..
"s1d. at 23-25.
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reference for his decision. Conversely, the absence of enunciated Board
policy is likely to result in the examiner's being uninformed of Board
thinking and therefore without meaningful guidance for reaching a decision acceptable to the Board. This unfortunate situation inevitably results
in the Board reconsidering the whole case in depth with the wastage of
the Board's very valuable time and energy. This is precisely the situation
which prevailed in the Seven States Area Investigation case. I" Because of
an absence of Board policy in that case the examiner was virtually without
direction." As a result, his decision, which required two years to reach,
was discarded and another year passed before the Board resolved the issue
by its own decision." Time, energy, and patience of the Board, examiner,
and parties to the proceeding had been wasted as a result of a lack of policy
direction.
It is clear that the absence of enunciated guiding policy can result in
serious deficiencies in the adjudicative process of federal administrative
agencies such as the CAB. The utilization of a hearing examiner, to improve the efficiency of the Board's functioning, can have the opposite
effect where no Board policy has been enunciated as the Board will have
to rehear the matter in depth in more cases than would be necessary if
policy were first enunciated.

B. The Evolution Of CAB Subsidy Policy For Local Service Carriers
1. A Brief History of Commercial Aviation and Regulatory Legislation
Air transport has progressed in giant strides from its origin 65 years
ago." Today commercial air transport is unquestionably the dynamic
growth leader of the transportation industry. 3 For a time in 1903, when
Langley's "aerodrome" was splashing into the Potomac River and taking a
$50,000 hope of the United States Government with it,' it looked as
though mankind was destined to remain earthbound. The successful 284
yard, 59 second, flight by the Wright Brothers on December 17, 1903, at
Kitty Hawk, North Carolina' laid to rest forever the notion that man was
not intended to fly and profoundly changed the course of history. World
War I greatly accelerated progress in aviation, the United States alone
training 10,000 men to fly and building 17,000 planes.2 6 During this period
Congress appropriated $1.25 billion for the purchase of Army aircraft
alone."'
A desire on the part of the government for speedy carriage of airmail
further hastened the development of air transport. " Airmail service was
"' Seven States Area Investigation, 28 C.A.B. 680 (1958).
2

0

21
22

23

id.
Id.
D. LOCKLIN, ECONOMICS OF TRANSPORTATION 762-63

(6th ed. 1966).

See W. JONES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REGULATED INDUSTRIES 744 (1967).
24
H.R. REP. No. 1328, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1958). [Hereinafter cited as H.R. RE'. No.
1328.]
" H. SMITH, AIRWAYS 19-25 (1942).
26 D. LOCRLIN, supra note 22, at 742.
27H. SMITH, supra note 25, at 39.
28
H.R. REP. No. 1328 at 8.
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initiated in 1918 by the government," and it was this service which was
destined to evolve into passenger carriage. Although the government
operated the early airmail routes, ° the Kelly Act of 1925 authorized the
Post Office Department to contract with private companies to carry the
mail." Government operation of mail routes ceased in 1927. Until this
time air transportation had been virtually free of regulatory control. 2
The Air Commerce Act of 19262 changed that situation however, by,
among other things, requiring the Secretary of Commerce to foster air
commerce through the establishment of airports and air navigation facilities, by collecting and disseminating statistics, and by investigating and
reporting air crashes and accidents."4
The Lindbergh transatlantic flight of 1927"2 aroused substantial speculative interest in airline stocks in 1 9 2 8 ." The airline industry boom led to
the formation, by consolidation of regional operations of several airlines
into three large airline combines, the forerunners of United Airlines,
American Airlines, and Trans World Airlines. 7
The McNary-Watres Act of 1930"' had a very significant impact upon
the development of air passenger transportation. It provided for airmail
contracts to be awarded to the lowest bidder at rates based on a space
mileage basis regardless of the amount of mail actually carried." This, in
effect, provided subsidy to the mail-carrying airlines since they were able
to fly mail space empty thereby allowing passengers to be carried in the
empty mail space portion of the aircraft. An unfortunate consequence of
the McNary-Watres Act was its administration by the Postmaster General, who, contrary to law, awarded airmail contracts at secret meetings
known as "spoils conferences" instead of by competitive bidding.0
Because of the illegal aspects of such airmail contracts they were cancelled
by President Roosevelt in 1934 and the Army was assigned the task of
flying the mail. 41 The results were disastrous. The Army was not up to the
task, and 12 Army pilots lost their lives.'
The Army failure led to a policy reversal and the passing of the Airmail
Act of 1934. 43 The Act was designed to prevent a repetition of previous
abuses." Airmail contracts were to be replaced on a competitive bid basis,
certain financial and corporate interrelationships were prohibited, and,
individuals involved in the previous collusive contract bidding were proId.
30 D. LOCKLIN, supra note 22, at 762-63; H.
29

21
2
3

43 Stat. 805.

SMITH,

supra note 25, at 50-60.

H.R. REP,. No. 1328 at 9.
32Act of 2'01May 1924, ch. 344, 44 Stat. 568.
24Hanstra, Two Decades-Federal Aero-Regulation in Perspective, 12 J. AIR L. & COM. 105,
109-10 (1941).
"Trippe, Commerce on Wings, 9 J. AIR L. & COM. 74, 77 (1938).
26
7 H.R. REP. No. 1328 at 9.
3 1d. at 10.
"8Act of 29 April 1930, ch. 223, 46 Stat. 259.
39H. SMITH, supra note 25, at 159.
40S. RICHMOND, REGULATION AND COMPETITION IN AIR TRANSPORTATION
5 (1961).
41 Id. at 5-6.
" Hanstra, supra note 34, at 107.
42 Act of 12 June 1934, ch. 473, 48 Stat. 933.
44
H.R. REP. No. 1328 at 12.
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scribed from holding managerial positions in bidding airlines.' The Act
still allowed unsubsidized airlines to establish routes anywhere, even in
competition with the mail carriers. Only the mail carriers were regulated
at this time."
The situation prevailing between 1934 and 1938 saw the mail carriers
becoming increasingly anxious over competition and potential competition from the unsubsidized carriers." Competition in the airline industry
at this period could only be described as excessive. An example of the
degree of destructiveness of the "cut-throat competition" prevailing in
1937 was furnished by the airline industry's representative, Colonel Gorrell, who asserted that at that time, as a result of operating losses, only
$60 million remained of the original $120 million put into the airline
industry by investors, and, that of 100 companies which had entered the
airline business only 20 had survived. s The extreme competition and the
unfavorable economic conditions of the great depression combined to
render the airline industry financially unstable.
During the 1934-1938 period two important factors became obvious.
First, financial stability was vital to a safe air transport system and,
second, a financially sound and safe air transport industry was necessary
for national security and defense." The financial instability of the airline
industry caused by destructive competition and the general ill-health of the
eonomy in the 1930's s" induced Congress to provide comprehensive regulation of the airline industry in the form of the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938. Apprehensive over potential competition and concerned over possible economic collapse, the mail carriers had favored regulation of the
industry even before the passage of the Act."
The Civil Aeronautics Act provided a comprehensive system of regulation as well as detailed safety controls for the airline industry." The Civil
Aeronautics Authority, later the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), was
empowered to regulate entry into air transport, to regulate rates, services
and many inter- and intra-corporate transactions, and to control the
subsidy payment to airlines. 4 Inasmuch as the regulatory legislation was
enacted to curb abusive and destructive practices, it is not surprising that
the role of competition within that framework has been severely restricted." Nevertheless it is noteworthy that Congress in enacting the
45S. RICHMOND, supra note 40, at 6.

46Id.
47
4

Id.

8W. JONES, supra note 23, at 736.

4'Gellman, The Regulation of Competition in United States Domestic Air Transportation: A
judicial Survey and Analysis, 24 J. AIR L. 8 COM. 410, 413 (1957).
5

0See W. JONES, supra note 23, at 736.
of 23 June 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973.
2See S. RICHMOND, supra note 40, at 6, 7; H.R. REP. No. 1328 at 2.
" Hale & Hale, Competition or Control IV: Air Carriers, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 312 (1961).
54Id.
" The question regarding the necessity of regulation of the airline industry and the advantages
and disadvantages of regulating this industry will not be discussed in this paper. Not only is that
subject broad enough to be considered at length in a completely independent work, but also many
fine treatises and periodical articles exploring it in depth have been published. See S. RICHMOND,

5
Act
5

supra note 40, at 10-257;

MEYER, COMPETITION IN THE TRANSPORTATION

Gellman, supra note 49, at 414-34.

INDUSTRIES

(1959);
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comprehensive airline regulatory legislation of 1938 adhered to its general
policy of competition in the economy where feasible.' The Federal
Aviation Act was enacted in 1958" for the purpose of making more
effective the regulation of air safety. "s However, no substantial change
was made regarding the regulation of economic matters by the 1958 Act."'
The Civil Aeronautics Board, established under the Civil Aeronautics
Act and continued under the Federal Aviation Act, is an independent
Federal agency made up of 5 members appointed by the President for 6
year terms." No more than three members can be appointed from the
same political party." The Board is charged with carrying out the Congressional mandate, as expressed in the Federal Aviation Act. In that connection it exercises broad legislative, regulatory, and judicial functions."
Pursuant to its responsibility to regulate and control air transport the
CAB found it necessary to classify the various air carriers into distinct
groups."1 Apart from a general classification of air carriers into private,
contract, and common carriers the CAB, pursuant to its statutory authority, 4 has classified the air carriers into seven groups as follows:" 1) domestic trunklines; 2) local service carriers; 3) helicopter carriers; 4) intraAlaska carriers; 5) intra-Hawaii carriers; 6) domestic all-cargo carriers;
and 7) international and territorial carriers.
2. The Creation and Nature of Local Service Carriers
In terms of revenue passenger-mileage flown, the local service industry
is still standing in the shadow of its larger brothers, the domestic trunk
carriers and the international and territorial carriers."0 Nevertheless, this
"little brother" of the scheduled passenger airline industry forms an
integral part of the national air transportation system. Broadly speaking,
this segment of the industry is charged with the responsibility of providing
"local service" between small communities and "feeder service" between
small communities and the larger cities. Of a total of 23 local service
carriers originally certificated by the CAB, only 13 remain presently, and
5"H.R. REP. No. 1328 at 3.
"Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 73 Stat. 180, 427; 74 Stat. 255, 445,
901; 75 Stat. 210, 466, 497, 523, 785; 76 Stat. 143, 832, 921, 936, 49 U.S.C. 55 1301-1542 (1964).
58 Hale & Hale, supra note 52, at 312.
59 Id.
00UNITED

STATES

e1 Id.
1
2 J. FREDERICK,

GOVERNMENT

ORGANIZATION

MANUAL

COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORTATION

63C. FULDA, COMPETITION IN

THE REGULATED

89

(3d

1967-68

ed.

at 422-23

(1967).

1951).

INDUSTRIES: TRANSPORTATION

192

(1961).

"The Board may from time to time establish such just and reasonable classifications or groups
of air carriers for the purposes of this subchapter as the nature of the services performed by such
04

air carriers shall require; and such just and reasonable rules and regulations pursuant to and consistent with the provisions of this subchapter, to be observed by each such class or group, as the
Board finds necessary in the public interest." Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 416, 72 Stat. 771, 49

U.S.C. § 1386 (1964).
6 D. LOCKLIN, supra note 22, at 770.
00 In the year ended 30 June 1966, the local service industry flew 2,966,293 revenue-passenger-miles, the international and territorial carriers flew 18,514,640 revenue-passenger-miles and
the domestic trunk carriers flew 54,672,061 revenue-passenger-miles. 1966 C.A.B. Ann. Rep.
at 77, 79, 81. Thus, the local service carriers' flew a scant 2.56% of total revenue-passenger-miles
for the year ended 30 June 1966.
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this number will soon be further reduced as consolidations are consumated
The disinterest in providing service to the smaller communities of the
nation displayed by the domestic trunklines caused the CAB to reflect
upon finding an appropriate method to service these less populous areas.
Since the trunklines were preoccupied with the more profitable longhaul
traffic the Board was forced to give consideration to certificating a new
"feeder" level of air transport to furnish the necessary service."
In 1944 the CAB announced as its local and feeder policy a program
designed to connect the small communities by air with the larger air
centers where there seemed to be "a justifiable expectation of success at a
reasonable cost to the government."" The initial experiment of local and
feeder air transport had been commenced, subject to ultimate Board confirmation of policy, with a route award to Essair in the Continental Air
Lines, Inc. et al., Texas Air Service decision on November 5, 1943.70
Therein the Board stated:
[T]here appears to be a substantial need for local service performed with
equipment chosen with primary reference to the requirements of the Intermediate points to be served, such as that proposed by Essair. We think that
this type of service should be inaugurated as a practical extension of needed
air transportation to the smaller Texas cities on Essair's proposed route. Since
the authorization can be a temporary one it need not be deemed to foreclose
any of the numerous questions of policy involved in the investigation of local,
feeder, and pick up air services.'
The first members of the group were admitted on an experimental
basis receiving only temporary certificates.7 ' The first permanent certificates were not granted until 1955.'s Since 1955 virtually all certificate
awards to local service carriers have been of the permanent variety.
The primary role of the local service carrier as originally conceived was
to provide air transport between the small communities and the large
urban centers, a market that the trunks had largely neglected and sought
to dispose of. A more detailed explanation of the local carriers' role was
provided by the Board's careful distinction between local and trunk

carriers in the Piedmont Certificate Renewal Case:
67The present carriers in the local service carrier classification are Allegheny Airlines, Bonanza
Air Lines, Central Airlines, Frontier Airlines, Lake Central Airlines, Mohawk Airlines, North Central Airlines, Ozark Air Lines, Pacific Air Lines, Piedmont Aviation, Southern Airways, Trans-Texas
Airways, West Coast Airlines. D. LoCKLIN, supra note 22, at 771. The existing local service carriers
now cover more route miles and fly many times more revenue-passenger-miles annually than did the
23 local service carriers originally certificated. See, e.g., 1966 C.A.B. Ann. Rep. 4, 81, 82; 1949
C.A.B. Ann. Rep. 54, 55.

"'Ray, The Feeder Airline Story, 16 J. AIR L. & CoM. 379, 380 (1949).
"'Investigation of Local, Feeder, and Pickup Air Service, 6 C.A.B. 1, 4 (1944).
" Continental Air Lines, Inc., Texas Air Service, 4 C.A.B. 478, 492 (1943).
71 Id. at 484.
72
Service in Rocky Mountain States Area, 6 C.A.B. 695 (1946).
7 Southwest Airways, Permanent-Certificate Case, 21 C.A.B. 830 (1955). The local carriers
operating prior to 1955 received grandfather operating rights. To establish grandfather rights a
carrier was required to show that it was an air carrier furnishing local or feeder service of persons,
property and mail under a temporary certificate from January 1, 1953 to the date of application.
Southwest Airways Co., Permanent Certificate Case, 21 C.A.B. 830, 831 (1955).
74
H.R. REP. No. 1328 at 24.
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These [local] carriers receive mail compensation at a much higher rate
unrelated to the volume of mail they carry. When created, local carriers were
initially identified as 'feeder' operators, indicative of their anticipated role
of feeding traffic to the trunkline carriers for long-haul travel. The experience
of the local service carriers indicates that the major traffic they serve is local
in character between smaller points and their trade centers, and to a lesser
degree between the smaller points themselves. The present line of demarcation
between the services of local and trunkline carriers in some respects is not
always clear. Many trunkline routes contain small cities between major
points, comparable to local service routes. However, the principal distinction
appears to be that local service carriers generally are required to serve each
point in the order designated in their certificates in each flight over a particular route segment. On the other hand, trunkline carriers are free to schedule
service to the smaller points on a skip stop or local basis as they see fit,
subject only to the adequate service requirement of Section 404 of the Act."

The role of the local carriers, as described by the Board, resembles only
generally the present role of the local carrier and less still its probable
future role.7" However, the foregoing Board statement does serve to distinguish the charcater of the local and trunkline carriers adequately, although as stated by the Board, the line of demarcation between the two is
not always clear." This is especially true today in view of the local carriers
great growth from mergers and certification on to dense routes."8
The provision of true local service, that is shorthaul service to small
communities, is an expensive proposition since several factors militate
"Piedmont Certificate Renewal Case, 15 C.A.B. 736, 810 (1952). Shortly after the local carriers received permanent certification in 1955, the Board offered the following definition of a local
service carrier: "An air carrier authorized by certificate of public convenience and necessity to provide regularly scheduled services within the United States of a shorthaul, local, or feeder character."
1955 C.A.B. Ann. Rep. 24.
76 The local carriers today have expanded by merger and dense route awards. Whereas the trunklines once resembled them in providing local service, the local carriers now resemble the trunklines
in providing dense route service. Though the line of demarcation has never been completely clear
they are presently distinguished by relative size, preponderance of shorthaul, local and feeder traffic, and general confinement to one region of the country (although these distinguishing features
seem to be rapidly disappearing).
" In some cases it is very difficult to distinguish, on the basis of characteristics, a local service
carrier from a trunkline carrier. As noted, the Board has classified the certificated air carriers into
seven groups. D. LOCKLIN, supra note 22, at 770. The domestic trunklines are: American Airlines,
Braniff Airways, Continental Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Eastern Air Lines, National Airlines, Northeast Airlines, Northwest Airlines, Trans World Airlines, United Airlines and, Western Air Lines,
D. LocKLIN, supra note 22, at 771. The local carriers were enumerated in note 67, supra. The only
certain method of identifying a local (or trunk) carrier is by making reference to the named carriers in the Board's own classification of local and trunk carriers.
78 One inevitable question of course was whether certification of the local service system was
really necessary? This question in turn raises the more fundamental question of whether air transport
service was necessary for the nation's smaller communities. Pursuant to the requirement of the Civil
Aeronautics Act to encourage and develop air transport, the Board decided that it had a responsibility to promote the extension of air routes to those smaller communities of the nation not presently receiving air service. Zook, The Certification of Local and Feeder Air Carriers, 7 Sw. L.J. 185,
190 (1953). The trunk carriers were not interested in carrying the local traffic and it was theorized
by the Board that, in any event, in developing the limited traffic potential local service market
"[g]reater effort and the exercise of managerial ingenuity may be expected from an independent
local operator whose continuation in the air transportation business will be dependent upon the
successful development of traffic on the routes and the operation of the service on an adequate and
an economical basis." Rocky Mountain States Case, 6 C.A.B. at 737. The Board opted for establishing a separate local service system where there was a "justifiable expectation of success at a reasonable cost to the government." Local Feeder and Pickup Case, 6 C.A.B. at 4. Since the Board
was only proceeding experimentally, and at the same time attempting to balance fairly the interests
of service against cost, the conclusion follows that the Board's course of action, establishing a secondary air transport system, was the proper one under the circumstances.
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against profitability: i.e., the typically light traffic density," the relatively
short hauls involved," ° the high variability in traffic volume carried," the
intermodal competition with railroads and buses for traffic," and the
general obsolescence and unsuitability of the aircraft used for local service.
Given the problems of cost and demand, local service requires the assistance of subsidy. The CAB developed a subsidy program to satisfy this
local carrier requirement."
Presently, the local carriers still require subsidy support. The origins and
development of local carrier subsidization will be explored in the succeeding section.
3. The Origins and Development of Local Service Subsidization:
1944-1968
It had been demonstrated that the provision of inherently costly short
haul local service is likely the most expensive form of air passenger transportation. As a consequence local service has been subsidized directly by
the Federal Government since its inception in 1944." *
Subsidy payment" was first received by the airlines in the form of compensation for transporting airmail. The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938
provided that such compensation be based on the "need"" of each carrier
for compensation in addition to its other revenue, that would allow, under
efficient management, the development of air transportation. 7 Congress
clearly intended to subsidize the airlines to the level of adequate revenues."
In 1951 the CAB separated the fair-compensation and the subsidy elements
J. FREDERICK, supra note 62, at 157.

7

0

1 ld. at 158.
81
Id. at 159.
82
Id. at 160.
" Although subsidy could have been made internal, by the CAB's forcing the trunklines to
provide local service with losses being borne by the profitable trunk routes, the CAB rejected this
approach and accepted instead a direct government subsidy program. The approach appears sound
as it allowed the development of the trunklines to proceed unimpeded. It was favored by the local
carriers as a matter of necessity.
84 Local Feeder and Pickup Case, 6 C.A.B. at 3, 4; Gurney, The Development and Progress of
the Local Service Airline Industry, 6 S.D.L. REV. 79, 91 (1961).
" Subsidization of the local service carriers takes three forms: 1) the airlines are allowed to use
without charge the airways maintained by the Federal Government; 2) they may make payment
for the use of public airports that do not meet the full costs; and 3) mail transportation payments
contain a substantial subsidy for local service carriers. D. LocKLIX', supra note 22, at 784. Only
direct (mail) subsidy payments to the local carriers will be explored in this paper.
"'The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 406, 72 Star. 763, as amended, 76 Stat. 145, 49 U.S.C.A.
1376 (1966), 136 provides for airmail payments on the basis of the "need" of each carrier. This
is the basis of the CAB's authority to provide subsidy payments. The legality of resort to a class
subsidy rate by the CAB rather than an individual subsidy rate, as prevailed prior to 1961, seems
at least arguable. The CAB argues strenuously that a class rate can be fixed and still provide an
individual carrier with its "need" under the statute. Local Service Class Subsidy Rate Investigation,
34 C.A.B. 416, 433-34 (1961). In any event it appears as though the Board's authority to establish
a class rate has not been successfully challenged, since the class rate is still in operation, in revised
form in 1968. See AVIATION WEEK, Dec. 18, 1967 at 34.
87 Act of 23 June 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 998. This provision has been retained by the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, § 406, 72 Stat. 763, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1376 (1966).
88""The Civil Aeronautics Act has established the rule that where the other revenues of an air
carrier do not suffice to meet the expenses of developing and maintaining air transportation as required in the national interest, the airmail compensation shall be given the marginal role, and shall
be established at such a level as is necessary to build the total revenues up to the required level."
Pennsylvania-Central Airlines Corp., Mail Rates, 4 C.A.B. 22, 51 (1942).

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[Vol. 34

in airmail payments." In 1953 President Eisenhower transferred the function of paying the airmail subsidy portion to the CAB while leaving the
payment of service airmail pay with the Post Office Department."0 By 1966
the local service carriers were the only airlines within the 48 continguous
states receiving subsidy, with the exception of a New England trunkline
which was also flying several local service routes.9 '
As mentioned, the first subsidy payment by way of airmail was determined by a carrier's need. "Need" was calculated by first estimating the
expenses to provide a reasonable amount of service, as well as return on
investment, and then deducting all anticipated revenues. The balance
represented "need" and would be paid as airmail pay by the Post Office
Department." The individualized local service subsidy determination has
two advantages: 1) it allows a subsidy to be tailored to the peculiar
requirements of an individual carrier; and 2) it provides a precise method
of controlling the earnings of each carrier. On the other hand, this method
of subsidy is not without deficiencies: 1) when a subsidy rate is inadequate
or excessive it results in extended open-rate periods requiring subsidy rates
to be fixed retroactively, necessitating adjustments in reported earnings of
the local carrier, and thereby adversely affecting the carrier's credit; 2)
open rates discourage a carrier from maximizing efficiency as carriers
are aware additional schedules will be underwritten with subsidy, provided
general Board standards of economy and efficiency are met; and 3) when
normal business incentive is lacking the Board's administrative burden
becomes heavier as more careful scrutiny of the economy and efficiency
aspects of local carrier operations is necessary.
Because the CAB believed that a class rate subsidy would have distinct
advantages over the individualized subsidy, namely, the creation of
stronger incentives to efficiency, the elimination of extended open rates,
and, the lightening of the administrative burden of the Board, it established a class subsidy for the local service carriers. 3 In 1963, after two
s D. LOCKLIN, supra note 22, at 786.
5
" The President's statement is printed in 20 J. AIR L. & COM. 210 (1953). The separation of
subsidy and service mail pay was codified in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 406, 72 Stat. 763,
as amended, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1376 (1966).
9' 1966 C.A.B. Ann. Rep. at 35.
saD. LoCKLIN, supra note 22, at 818. This method of subsidy became obsolete with the prosperity brought to many large airlines by World War II in 1942. Need was greatly reduced by the
fact that many carriers' revenues frequently exceeded their estimated costs and by the "need"
formula would not be entitled to receive mail payments for the mail that they carried. Consequently
the CAB separated mail payment into that based on "need," as before, and that based on actual
service. Prior to 1961 local service carrier subsidies were determined on the basis of need. Two
variations of the need-based subsidy have been described by the Board:
"[T]he Board has always established subsidy rates on an individual carrier basis. Two types
of subsidy rates have been employed: (1) a past period rate which is determined on the basis of actual results, and (2) a future rate which is based upon forecast operations. In either case, however,
the same basic approach has been followed. The financial and traffic reports and forecasts are subject to audit and analysis, and adjustments are made to reflect more accurately the earnings of the
period as well as to disallow expenses and investment found to be uneconomical or inefficient or
not in accordance with statutory standards. After all adjustments, a carrier's subsidy rate is fixed
in an amount sufficient to meet its break even need (the difference between expenses and other revenues) plus a reasonable return on investment after taxes." Local Service Class Subsidy Rate Investigation, 34 C.A.B. 416, 429 (1961).
" The class rate subsidy program was described by the Board as follows:
The . . . class rate consists of a scale of rates based upon volume of operations per

1968]

CAB AND SUBSIDY REDUCTION

years of operation of the 1961 class rate subsidy formula, the formula
was revised. The Board hastened to indicate that the rationale supporting
the original 1961 class rate formula was still totally applicable and that
revision was sought only to eliminate adverse incentives and generally
improve the original rate formula. 4 The Board frankly stated that
[T]he class-rate concept in air transportation is still in its infancy, and even
as revised the proposed rate will not solve all of its problems, whether foreseen
or unforeseen. Undoubtedly problems will arise requiring additional amendments in the future, and consequently, the Board's staff will continue its study
of the class rate with an eye to improvement through future amendments."5
The Board correctly defined the need for amendment of the class-rate
subsidy formula in the interests of general improvement and solving new
problems.'
There can be no question that the class-rate subsidy is a great improvestation: as revenue plane-miles per station increase, the unit subsidy rate per available
seat-mile flown is reduced. The monthly subsidy payable to each carrier under the
class rate will be based upon (1) the carrier's available seat miles during the month
times (2) a rate per seat-mile varying with the revenue plane miles per station per
day for the particular carrier in the month given in accordance with the scale of
rates contained in appendix I. No additional subsidy is paid for operations in excess
of the 600 plane-miles per station per day. The proposed class rate also contains a
profit sharing formula under which the carriers will refund to the Board (1) 50
percent of profits between a fair rate of return and a return of 15 percent on investment and (2) 75 percent of profits in excess of a return of 15 percent on investment. Earnings deficiencies will be permitted to be carried forward to 2 future
years as an offset against any future excess earnings.
Local Service Class Subsidy Rate Investigation, 34 C.A.B. 416, 428 (1961). See also id. at 433-50.
"4The Board believed that its initial decision to scale the original rate to miles per station per
day and applied to seat miles created a formula sensitive to changes in the number of stations but
insensitive to the capacities of the aircraft employed. The revised formula provided for a local
service carrier subsidy rate based upon seat miles flown per month, varying inversely with the
traffic density as measured by the average number of plane departures per station per day. The revised formula also reflected Board interest in reducing subsidy payment to the local carriers by providing for exclusion of "non-subsidy" routes from subsidy and reducing payments on "subsidyreduction" routes, both types of route being determined by the Board. The revised formula retained
intact the profit-sharing aspect of the original class rate which provided for a recapture of a portion of a local carrier's earnings in excess of a prescribed fair rate of return. The recapture program was designed to prevent some carriers from receiving more subsidy than needed. Local Service
Class Subsidy Rate, 39 C.A.B. 65, 72 (1963). Where a carrier's annual earnings exceeds its differentiated rate of return it is required to refund a portion of those profits to the government. The
differentiated rate of return is a weighted average based on a rate of return of 5.5 percent on debt
capital and 21.35 percent on common equity capital applied to the carriers' own capital structure.
Maximum overall return is 12.75 percent, minimum is 9 percent. 50 percent of any profits above
12.75 percent but not exceeding 15 percent must be refunded and 75 percent on any additional
profits must also be refunded. Rate of Return, Local Service Carriers Investigation, 31 C.A.B. 685
(1960); D. LOCKLIN, supra note 22, at 822.
'Local Service Class Subsidy Rate, 39 C.A.B. 65, 73 (1963).
9'While retaining the class-rate subsidy concept the Board has strived to refine it. 1966 C.A.B.
Ann. Rep. 36. In April, 1967 sweeping changes in the class rate formula were proposed by the
Board, the most significant of which was the implementation of a new class rate formula which
would replace the profit sharing mechanism. AVIATION WEEK, April 10, 1967 at 36. This new tack
by the Board again reflects its resolve to decrease overall subsidy payment (in this case by $3.1
million from the 1966 level) to the local carriers. Proposals also included: approved subsidy rates
for general aviation-type aircraft used by local carriers; further encouragement of management
efficiency incentive by using industry average cost, revenue, and investment data; limitation of the
total amount of subsidy to be paid to any one carrier; limitation of subsidy to two round trips
daily between two points served on routes eligible for subsidy; and finally, the relating of subsidy
payments partially to service between city-pairs on a carrier's routes, as opposed to the overall system basis that prevailed before. AVIATION WEEK, April 10, 1967 at 36, 37. All proposals were put
into operation by the Board the following month, completing a comprehensive revision of the class
subsidy rate. AVIATION WEEK, May 29, 1967 at 75.

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[Vol. 34

ment over the less sophisticated individual or "need" based subsidy. In
providing local service the most efficient and economical methods must be
employed in the public interest." Certainly a vital key to an efficient and
economical operation is managerial incentive to efficiency. Therein lies the
real strength of the class subsidy rate. As indicated previously, the class
rate is designed to encourage managerial incentive, not discourage it.
Various refinements have been made to the formula specifically for that
purpose which make the rate even more effective in providing incentive.
The main advantage of the formerly used individual rate, namely, that
it could tailor a rate to an individual carrier, loses its significance when
assayed as to its power to provide incentive to efficiency. More often than
not it provides an incentive to inefficiency by encouraging open rates and
retroactive subsidy which in turn allow the carrier to take uneconomic
route and schedule risks which would ordinarily be declined.
The class rate subsidy also eases the administrative burden of the Board,
thus increasing its efficiency. Attempts to "close" open rates and assess the
efficiency of some local carriers done during an open rate period only robs
the Board and its staff of their time. This increased efficiency reflects in
smoother operation of the local carriers as a result of quicker hearings and
reviews, and releases both the Board and its staff to deal with other
responsibilities.
4. The Current Policy of Local Service Carrier Subsidy Reduction:
Origins and Implementation
Other than the requirement that the cost to the government be reasonable, little consideration was accorded the possibility of subsidy reduction in the early CAB decisions establishing local service on an experimental basis. Perhaps this stemmed from the temporary certification of
the local carriers, the rapid growth of these carriers, and concomitant
subsidy requirements not being foreseen by the Board.
The principle of permanent subsidy for local carriers was soon attacked
by Board member Jones in 1951, who vigorously urged that "[t]he establishment of a nationwide network of permanently subsidized local service
airlines is unsound transportation policy.""8 The possible growth of a
permanent subsidy requirement for the local carriers was not mentioned
by the CAB when the locals were granted permanent certificates in 1955
since no reference to subsidy growth or subsidy reduction appears in the
CAB annual report for that year. 9
The CAB policy favoring subsidy reduction did not suddenly appear,
but evolved gradually over a span of years. It was not formally published
but appeared from time to time in annual reports of the Board, speeches of
Board members, hearings before various Congressional committees and
"7Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 102, 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1964).
Trans-Texas Certificate Renewal Case, 12 C.A.B. 606, 621 (1951). Jones' grounds for opposing a permanently subsidized system of local service carriers were that "[it] tends to perpetuate
government financial support of air transport, and to extend such services into a field of least relative advantage, with a resulting impairment of surface transportation facilities contrary to the
national interest." Id. at 623.
" See 1955 C.A.B. Ann. Rep. at 4, 7.
98
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subcommittees, and in press releases.
As indicated previously, a policy, not formally published, can only be
satisfactorily defined by reference to the original materials announcing it.
In 1958 the Board held out little hope for any reduction of subsidy in the
foreseeable future.' The Board added that: "At best it is believed that
.. . the subsidy bill for local service will increase for several years, but
that then the trend may reverse.''. The Board's choice of the word "may"
indicates its uncertainty as to whether the trend of rising subsidy actually
would reverse. By 1959 the Board was cautiously optimistic in stating that
"it is hoped that this trend will be reversed."'' By 1961 the CAB was
taking steps on its own initiative designed to reduce subsidy.' Foremost
among these was the institution of a new method for determining subsidy
known as the class rate.' The Board had thus demonstrated its determination to "control ... the total subsidy level, with a view towards reduction thereof in the long range future.
,"05 In 1962 the Board predicted
that the upward subsidy trend would peak in 1963, then reverse. The
Board attributed the future reversal to its implementation of a class subsidy rate, a guaranteed loan program, final subsidy rates, and a relatively
mild form of route strengthening.' 7
New impetus was added to the Board's evolving policy of subsidy
reduction by President Kennedy's Special Message to Congress on April 5,
1962. In it Kennedy declared:
I am asking the Board to develop by June 30, 1963, a step-by-step program
with specific annual targets, to assure sharp reduction of operating subsidies
to all [local service] airlines as well, within periods to be established by the
Board.. .. '

Kennedy suggested that rigorous enforcement of the "use-it-or-lose-it"
policy, refinement of the class subsidy rate plan of 1961, and the establishment of single airports to serve adjacent cities would facilitate subsidy
reduction to some extent."'
Within the limits of protocol in dealing with the affairs of independent
regulatory agencies, the President's special message can be interpreted as a
direct command to the CAB to reduce the subsidy program. Whereas
previously the Board had leaned toward subsidy reduction at some distant
future time, now it had an Executive mandate which unequivocally dictated a policy of subsidy reduction.
In compliance with the President's request and pursuant to its policy of
subsidy reduction, the CAB tendered to the President a four-point program
'0' 19T8 C.A.B. Ann. Rep. at 19.
1"'Id.
10' 1959 C.A.B. Ann. Rep. at 20.
'03 1961 C.A.B. Ann. Rep. at 31.
"' The class rate is discussed at length in the previous section, supra.
'0 1961 C.A.B. Ann. Rep. at 31.
'06 1962 C.A.B. Ann. Rep. at 23, 24.

107Id. at 24.
108 KENNEDY,

Special Message to the Congress on Transportation, PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE

PRESIDENT, JOHN F. KENNEDY,

09id. at 297.

1962 (1962)

at 292, 297.
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designed to reduce local service subsidy and at the same time continue
the small-center air transport function of the locals and meet their operational and financial problems. The CAB Report to the President of July 3,
1963, predicted that subsidy could be reduced by $25 million from the
$81 million 1962 level, over a five year period, by four principal means."'
Subsidy savings would result from 1) airline revenues increasing at twice
the rate of increased costs; 2) gradual reduction of subsidy payment for
flights on high density routes; 3) consolidation of airports for two or more
1I
cities; and 4) continued application of the "use-it-or-lose-it-policy.
The Board specifically rejected the acquisition of more efficient equipment
as a method of subsidy reduction and deferred any consideration of route
strengthening by certification of local carriers on to dense traffic routes
until such time as hearings could be held."' The CAB made no mention
whatever of potential subsidy reduction stemming from local service airline mergers in its Report to the President.
President Kennedy's assassination occurred only months after the CAB
Report on Subsidy was tendered. While the Report was not specifically
endorsed by the Chief Executive, parts of it were already in use, or subsequently were put into effect by the Board. In 1964 the Board reported a
reversal of the upward subsidy trend with a $1.4 million saving in local
subsidy payment over fiscal year 1963.2" The Board attributed the favorable results to revenues increasing more quickly than costs, the implementation and refinement of a class rate subsidy, and the "strengthening of
the carriers' route structures."' 1 '
The Board, having adopted as its own, and forcefully enunciated a
policy favoring subsidy reduction, was now forced to cast about for the
most effective method or methods of implementing its policy. Two
important questions arise at this point for consideration. The first question, concerning the degree of subsidy reduction, is not capable of a final
answer, but even in 1961 Board member Gurney stated that "the ultimate
goal would be service without the need for subsidy.' 1' Whether the ultimate goal is total reduction of subsidy or only substantial reduction is not
of great significance at this moment. The significant point is that the
Board has committed itself to a policy of subsidy reduction. The methods
of effectuation of the policy will be much the same in either case regardless of the specific long term goal.
The second question of import concerns the reason for reducing subsidy.
A partial answer appears to be the conviction that an efficient system of
transportation can only be achieved through unsubsidized free enterprise,"'
and this consideration outweighs other considerations, such as potentially
"0 CAB,

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON AIRLINE

TRANSPORTATION MESSAGE OF' 1962 (1963).
ON

SUBSIDY.]

"I
112

id.
Id.

at 1-3.
at 3.

11 1964 C.A.B. Ann. Rep. at 30.
114id. at 21, 30.

II Gurney, supra note 84, at 91.
116 KENNEDY, supra note 108, at 294.
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deficient service, which favor subsidized local service.
In its search for effective methods of policy implementation the Board
continued to refine its methods. In 1965 it described a four-point program
for subsidy reduction adding the transfer of certain trunkline points to
local carriers and a route realignment plan to "extend the operating
authority of the local service carriers," to its existing use-it-or-lose-it and
airport consolidation program."" Much greater developments were not
long in coming.
Hearings held in late February and early March, 1966, allowed CAB
Chairman C. S. Murphy to announce and elaborate upon ambitious programs to reduce subsidy."'R Murphy asserted that the subsidy could only be
reduced by increasing the earnings of the local carriers."' As a first step
toward this end he suggested "the introduction of the new, more efficient
pure jet aircraft," hopefully to reduce unit costs and generate additional
traffic and revenue.'"
Far more significant than the introduction of new equipment was
Murphy's indication that the Board favored route strengthening for local
service carriers to the point of certificating them into shorter dense traffic
routes in direct competition with trunkline carriers in an effort to increase
their revenues:
The local carriers have requested that the Board strengthen their systems by
relaxing present route and operating restrictions, by allowing them to compete
with trunklines in denser markets, and by awarding them new operating
authority over potentially profitable routes. This avenue for strengthening the
local carriers, and hopefully deducing [sic] their dependence on subsidy support, is one which the Board views with favor and which it plans to pursue
on a case-by-case basis."'
This announcement by the Board reversed its former position of avoiding direct local-trunk competition. The Board reasoned "that the relatively much larger size of the trunk carriers and their present favorable
earnings position, will make it possible to strengthen the routes of the local
carriers without significant impairment of the position of the trunks.""'
This new program also overrides the original concept of the local carrier
as a provider of air transport to small communities only. The Board did
not elaborate at this point as to whether the role of the local carrier was
being revised, but it is evident that the implementation of a program of
such magnitude could have a great impact on the role of local carriers in
the national transportation pattern.
Somewhat more subtly Chairman Murphy laid the foundation for a
second far reaching program of subsidy reduction. Murphy indicated that
mergers would be a useful means of reducing subsidy. When questioned
by Senator Monroney cocnerning the desirability of local carrier mergers,
i171965 C.A.B. Ann. Rep. at 16-20.
""Hearings on the Local Air Carrier Industry, supra note 3, at 27-74.
19Id. at 33.
12oId.
121Id. at 35, 3 6.
122Id. at 36.
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Murphy stated that he would look on such mergers with an open and
sympathetic mind. He also suggested that there might very well be substantial economic advantages to such mergers. 2 '
This statement was not part of any prepared text. It was an ad hoc,
personal answer. As such it lacks any binding effect upon the Board. It
does indicate, however, the then Board Chairman's predisposition toward
the use of local carrier mergers where the resulting economic benefits will
reduce subsidy, and where no curtailment of local small community service
will result. Because there is no evidence indicating that the Board favors
local carrier mergers as a means of subsidy reduction, it can be concluded
that there exists no formal program to that effect. The most that can be
said in this regard is, that all other factors being equal, it is probable that
the Board would concur in these views of the chairman. "
On June 30, 1966, the Board outlined a comprehensive and coordinated
five-point program designed to strengthen local carrier route structure and
thereby reduced subsidy. Although an intensive route strengthening plan,
the Board entitled its program "Realignment of System."' 23 The components of realignment were: granting more liberal operating authority;
certificating local carriers on to dense routes; segment realignment; airport consolidation; and elimination of points through "use-it-or-lose-it"
proceedings."'
With some exceptions the program above outlined indicates the most
recent Board methods of reducing subsidy payment to local carriers.
Recent press releases by the Board have added refinements to the programs. For example, the method of subsidy payment, the class-rate subsidy, has undergone several changes in attempts to reduce subsidy." 7
No mention of merger appears in the CAB system realignment program.
In the absence of any other stated modifications of the prior Board position
regarding mergers as a means to subsidy reduction, that position must be
presumed to continue in force.
It must be concluded that the CAB has adopted a policy favoring
subsidy reduction to local service carriers and pursuant thereto has determined to embark on the implementation of that policy. Some of the
programs, such as system realignment, are stated with some degree of
specificity. Others, such as merger encouragement, tend to be vague
at best.
It is one thing for the CAB to enunciate a policy of subsidy reduction
with plans and programs of implementation pursuant to it. It is something
else to effectuate that policy by means of its regular decisions. However,
the fact remains that the decisional process is the only effective method
available to the Board for implementing the Board policy.
13

Id. at 50.

124 The various Board members, being exposed to the same pressures, economic realities, and evi-

dence as the Chairman, would likely have a tendency to develop somewhat similar views.
1251966 C.A.B. Ann. Rep. at 4.
128Id.
".See Wall Street Journal, May 19, 1966, at 16; Wall Street Journal, June 27, 1966, at 1;
AVIATION WaEE, April 10, 1967, at 36, 37; AvIATION WEEKl, May 29, 1967, at 71,
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II. THE

DECISIONAL EFFECTUATION OF THE

CAB

POLICY OF

SUBSIDY REDUCTION IN MERGERS OF LOCAL SERVICE CARRIERS

A. The Need For Decisional Effectuation Of The CAB Subsidy
Reduction Policy
The Civil Aeronautics Board adopted a policy favoring subsidy reduction for the local service carriers on or about April 5, 1962. At that time
the gradual evolution of this policy, under the Board's guidance was
brought to fruition ,by President Kennedy's urging a policy of subsidy
reduction upon the Board in unequivocal terms and requesting the Board
to develop a program to reduce subsidy." 8 The Board complied with the
President's request and thereby adopted this policy as its own."' The imposition of a general policy on a federal regulatory agency raises a critical
question concerning the extent to which the agency will choose to effectuate such policy. More specifically, now that the CAB is totally committed
to a policy favoring subsidy reduction to the local carriers, what will be
its priority in regard to conflicting standards?
Whether the CAB carries out its enunciated policy of subsidy reduction
is a matter of utmost moment to both the Board and parties affected by
the policy. The reasons are not abstruse. First, it can safely be assumed
that the policy exists for the purpose of realizing the combined objectives,
of reducing subsidy to as low a level as possible, as quickly as possible.
Secondly, the failure to effectuate such a clearly announced policy would
be tantamount to perpetrating a fraud upon the parties affected since the
Board would be guilty of deliberately misleading the parties. Clearly, it is
deceitful to announce a policy with no intention whatever of implementing it, or even attempting to implement it, but knowing full well that
parties will rely on it, in one way or another, in conducting their affairs
in the future. Thirdly, such deliberate deceit would establish a "credibility
gap" between Board and affected or potentially affected parties. The longterm effect of a credibility gap would be a general erosion of the relationship between regulator and regulated, and future Board policy would be
received with skepticism. Fourthly, there are strong technical reasons for
effectuating announced policy. Such policy serves to refine and clarify
general legislative standards 3 and is important in maintaining the efficiency of the Board decisional process. 3' These later and related reasons
for policy formation have been previously discussed. 3 '
The foregoing discussion rests upon the premise that the effectuation of
the Board policy was realizable and not an impossibility. Some policy is as
difficult to implement as some law is difficult to enforce. However, in view
of the facts that the trunkline carriers were able to be weaned almost
completely from subsidy as far back as 1959,' and that the local service
128See Section 1. infra.
129

Id.

13' H. FRIENDLY, supra note 15.
131Hector,

Problems Of The CAB And The Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69

L.J. 931 (1960).

" See Section I, infra.
18 C. FuLDA, supra note 63, at 194; see C.A.B. Ann. Rep. 1960-66.
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carriers are experiencing much the same growth pattern and development
characteristics as the trunklines did before them,1"' the conclusion follows
that the Board policy of subsidy reduction for local carriers is realizable,
at least to a very large extent. Therefore, having announced the policy,
the possible excuse of impossibility of implementation is not available to
the Board to meet allegations of deliberate non-effectuation.
Perhaps even more disastrous than deliberate non-implementation of
policy is the prospect of selective implementation. Unless the reasons for
selectivity were logical, clear, and consistent, such an approach by the
Board would likely induce a form of schizophrenia in the parties forced
to live under the policy. Decisions pursuant to it would seem to provide
an additional source of concern rather than guidance. Such a situation is
likely to prevail, to some extent, when Board policy is not considered a
significant factor in Board decisions.
The conclusion follows that once announced, barring reversal, it is
obligatory upon the Board, for many reasons, to seek full effectuation of
the policy favoring subsidy reduction to local service carriers.
The Board should implement its own policy of subsidy reduction, but
does it do so in practice? That is the central question which we shall
seek to answer. Stated more precisely the question is three-pronged:
Having stated a policy of subsidy reduction, does the CAB effectuate it?
And, how? That is, by what means? And, to what extent? The satisfactory answering of these questions raises interesting questions concerning
the effect of the policy implementation upon the local carriers and the
airline industry as a whole.
Any consideration of policy effectuation compels a consideration of
means or methods. The process of actual implementation of policy involves
three steps. First, the policy must be formulated. Second, a plan or program designed to implement the policy must be adopted. Such programs
as route realignment, sometimes known as route strengthening, and merger
encouragement, 3 ' exemplify means of policy implementation. Finally the
plan or program itself must be put into operation through the Board's
subsequent decisions. It is instructive to note that the existence and content
of some implementation programs are more readily detected than others.
For example, the route realignment program was specifically set out in
detail by the CAB, as was its purpose,'3' but any "program" of merger
encouragement is much more difficult to detect and define, as will be seen.
The degree of implementation of policy by means of a special program is
another question requiring an answer. It is answerable only after a careful
analysis of decisions reached before and after the policy was implemented.
This method of analysis, explained in more detail subsequently, will be
used to determine whether or not the CAB policy of subsidy reduction
is being effectuated in local service merger decisions heard by the Board.
'See Elliott, Development of Third Level Air Transportation, 29 J. An' L. & CoM., 182 at
182-87 (1963).
...
The question of whether CAB encouragement of local carrier mergers is a program for
implementing the subsidy reduction program is discussed infra.
'36 1966 C.A.B. Ann. Rep. at 4.
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B. The Statutory Basis For Local Service Carrier Merger Applications
No mergers may occur between air carriers, between an air carrier and
a common carrier, or between an air carrier and one engaged in any other
phase of aeronautics without authorization by the CAB." 7 The pertinent
section provides in part:
It shall be unlawful unless approved by order of the Board as provided in this
section
(1) For two or more carriers, or for any air carrier and any other common
carrier or any person engaged in any other phase of aeronautics, to consolidate or merge their properties, or any part thereof, into one person for the
ownership, management, or operation of the properties theretofore in separate ownerships.138
With regard to the statutory standard applicable to merger applications
before the Board the Federal Aviation Act provides:
Any person seeking approval of a . . . merger . . . shall present an application
to the Board .... Unless . . . the Board finds that the ... merger ... will not

be consistent with the public interest or that the conditions of this section
will not be fulfilled, it shall by order approve such . . . merger ...

upon such

terms and conditions as it shall find to be just and reasonable and with such
modifications as it shall prescribe: Provided, that the Board shall not approve
any . . . merger ...

which would result in creating a monopoly or monopolies

and thereby restrain competition or jeopardize another air carrier not a party
to the ...

merger. ... "'

Since several Board decisions examined hereunder were handed down prior
to the enactment of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, it is important to
note that the above cited legislation was originally enacted in the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 193814' and was reenacted without substantial change
in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.

As indicated above the Act furnishes the Board with two standards
for testing merger applications. The first standard-the "public interest"
-is a vague test composed of many elements necessarily allowing the
Board a fairly wide discretion. The Board is directed by Section 102 of the
Federal Aviation Act to consider among other things, the encouragement
and development of an appropriate air transport system, the preservation
of the inherent advantages of air transport, the promotion of adequate,
economical, and efficient service with competition to the extent necessary,

as being in the "public interest.'. 1 The second standard, the antimonopoly
proviso, is even more elusive than the public interest standard. Neverthe117 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §§ 408, 409, 72 Stat. 767-68, as amended 74 Stat. 901, 49

U.S.C. §§ 1378-79 (1964). CAB approval of any local service (or trunkline) merger renders the
arrangement exempt from the antitrust laws and has done so since the enactment of the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 414, 72 Stat. 770, 49 U.S.C. S 1384
(1964); Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 414, 52 Stat. 980.
'Federal

Aviation Act of 1958, § 408(a)(1), 72 Stat. 767, as amended 74 Stat. 901, 49

U.S.C. § 1378(a)(1) (1964).
...Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 408(b), 72 Stat. 767, as amended 74 Stat. 901, 49 U.S.C.
1378(b) (1964).
140 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601,
§ 408, 52 Stat. 1001.
141Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 102, 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C. S 1302 (1964). This
section
is set out in full in Chapter I at note 10.
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less the Board is charged with the responsibility of measuring all merger
applications by these two standards in the hope of establishing a consistent pattern of rational decision.
In examining the Board approach to merger applications of local service
carriers, the initial point of inquiry will be the Board treatment of the
earliest merger application pursuant to the public interest and antimonopoly standards outlined in the substantially identical predecessor Civil
Aeronautics Act."' The earliest merger applications involved only trunklines as the local carriers were not conceived until the mid-forties. The
public interest standard will be considered first.
The first merger application was received by the Board (then the Civil
Aeronautics Authority) in 1939 and involved the proposed acquisition of
Western Air Express by United Airlines.' s United at the time flew primarily east-west routes from New York to California and was the fourth
largest domestic air carrier. " Western was the eighth largest carrier in
terms of route miles and flew primarily north-south routes along the
west coast of the United States.'" The Authority, after first stating that
Section 408 (b) governed the case,' added that the public interest "is not
a mere general reference to public welfare but has a direct relation to
definite statutory objectives. Thus Section 2 of the act directs the authority
to consider certain specific objectives as being in the public interest."''
To determine the public interest, therefore, the Board must make reference
to the statutory guidelines set out in Section 2 of the Civil Aeronautics
Act.' These standards, as previously noted, are so general that the Board
is allowed wide discretion in its assessment of the public interest.' Furthermore, the nature of a merger proceeding is such that the, great quantities
of specialized technical evidence that are presented to the Board are
related directly only to the parties involved. 5 ° Hence each case is considered to a large degree in an ad hoc manner with precedent playing only an
auxiliary role and the statutory standards of Section 2 of the Act being
relied on only for guidance in determining public interest.
Nevertheless, in determining whether a proposed trunkline merger
would be inconsistent with the public interest the Board has, over a period
of time, evolved certain factors which will bear consideration in its determination. Most factors are common to many trunkline merger proceedings
but receive varying emphasis and weight from case to case. These factors
will be mentioned only briefly in this context, a more thorough examination being undertaken subsequently in considering the application of such
.. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 408(b), 52 Stat. 1001.
14United Airlines Transport Corporation-Acquisition of Western Air Express, 1 C.A.A. 739
(1940).
44
1

Id. at 740.

145Id.
146 Id.
147Id. at 741.
148

Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 2, 52 Stat. 980.

141Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 2, 52 Stat. 980. Section 2 is substantially the same

as Section 102 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 102, 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1964),
set out in pertinent part in Chapter I supra.
'SoSee 1 C.A.A. 739 (1940).
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factors to the local carriers merger determinations.
The Board has devoted much time to achieving competitive balance
between trunkline carriers. A proposed merger which would, in the Board's
opinion, unbalance competition is considered contrary to public interest.''
It was primarily for this reason that the United-Western merger proposal
was rejected by the Board.' The Board also gives consideration to reasonableness of purchase price as a condition of approval."' Route integration potential economies and potential diversion of traffic from competing
carriers round out the factors considered by the Board in determining
violations of the public interest.
Some transference of these factors to local service carriers is observable.
Since the local carriers were conceived to provide primarily local and
feeder service between the smaller communities and medium-sized communities, and were not intended to be competitive with either the trunks

or each other as a result of their very high operational costs, the emphasis
on factors relating to public interest is likely to be somewhat different for
them." In fact this is precisely the case. Certain factors determinative of
public interest recur with frequency. Other factors, though important

to the public interest in trunkline merger applications, are rarely considered by the Board in local carrier merger cases.
As in the case of the trunklines, and for the same reasons, the weight of
precedent of the public interest factors is mitigated by the highly specific
factual context of each merger proposal. The local carrier merger applications do, however, tend to fall into a more stable pattern than do the

trunks regarding the factors determinative of public interest."'
The first local service carrier merger application to be heard by the
Board was the Monarch-ChallengerMerger Case."' This proposed merger
involved two small, western, local carriers operating route systems contiguous at Salt Lake City and Denver. The Board stated, in reaching a
decision, that the principal factors considered in determining public interest were a) whether an integrated route system would result from the
merger and b) whether more economical and efficient services would also
result." ' The Board also noted later in its opinion that the proposed merger
lacked potential diversionary effect upon traffic of intervenors Inland and

Continental."8 The Board's statements concerning factors determinative
of public interest are almost as significant for what they do not say as for

what they do. The Board made no mention of the effect upon balanced
competition, probably because the locals are not substantially competitive
1511,/.
152Id.
"'Acquisition of Marquette by TWA, 2 C.A.B. 1 (1940). The acquisition was approved when
the price was reduced. Acquisition of Marquette by TWA, 2 C.A.B. 409 (1940) (Supplemental
Opinion).
"'Piedmont Certificate Renewal Case, 15 C.A.B. 736, 810 (1952); See C. FULDA, supra note
63, at 192-94.
" See Arizona-Monarch Merger Case, 11 C.A.B. 246 (1950); Monarch-Challenger Merger
Case, 11 C.A.B. 33 (1949).
"'BMonarch-Challenger Merger Case, 11 C.A.B. 33 (1949).
157 Id. at 35.
"8 Id. at 37.
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with trunks or each other, and other than affecting competition through
diversion of traffic, are not directly concerned with competition or a balanced system of competition. (It is noteworthy that potential local competition does become a consideration in more recent merger and certification cases.) The controlling factors of the Board decision were clearly
stated to be prospective economies and efficiencies of service, a better integrated route system, and lack of any real diversionary consequences."'
The Board did not mention whether the merger would result in a survivor
of trunkline character, or whether the trade areas being connected were
related.
60
In the second local service merger, the Arizona-Monarch Merger Case,
the Board premised its approval of the proposed merger primarily upon
expected economies.. but also mentioned a lack of traffic diversion.'" Of
peripheral interest in this decision was the vigorous dissent advanced by
Board member Jones who opined that the combination of three local
carriers (Monarch, Challenger and Arizona) into one created a carrier
which was no longer "local" in nature and which therefore tended to
defeat the purpose of the local service experiment.'' The remaining four
Board members did not find that argument pursuasive. It is instructive to
note that, here also, with the exception of Jones' dissent, the Board did
not even give passing mention to whether the merger would result in a
survivor of trunkline character or whether the trade areas being connected
were related.
Several conclusions emerge from the matter heretofore considered. The
Board makes reference to the general guidelines of Section 2 of the Civil
Aeronautics Act in its consideration of the public interest. Since the
guidance provided by the Act is general and equivocal at best, the Board
has evolved more specific details relating to the public interest on which it
relies. The final Board determination of public interest is achieved by a
weighing of the factors determinative of public interest. The earliest local
service merger cases indicate that economy of operation, efficiency of
service, integration of route structure, and potential traffic diversion are
the public interest factors which most concern the Board.
The second standard which the Board must apply in deciding a merger
application is the antimonopoly proviso.' It provides that no merger
is to be approved by the Board "which would result in creating a monopoly
or monopolies and thereby restrain competition or jeopardize another air
carrier not a party to the ... merger.""' The very general nature of the
proviso makes its clarification by the enunciation of Board policy imperative. Although the Board could have facilitated clarification either by
articulating an opinion explaining its understanding of the proviso, or by
...Absence of monopoly discussed infra.
'"Arizona-Monarch Merger Case, 11 C.A.B. 246 (1950).
'et Id. at 247.
160Id. at 247-48.
...
Id. at 254-56.
104Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch, 601, § 48, 52 Stat. 1001. Reenacted without substantial
change in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 408, 72 Stat. 767, 49 U.S.C. § 1378 (1964).

' id.
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proceeding on a case by case process to isolate various factors pertinent to
a determination of monopoly, it made little effort to accomplish either."'
The Board offered its only attempt at interpreting the proper construction of the antimonopoly proviso in the United-Western Interchange
Case.' 7 Therein the Board perceived two distinct problems: " (1) Whether
or not any restraint of competition would prevent approval by the
Authority; and (2) whether or not jeopardy to another air carrier would
18
prevent such approval without regard to the existence of a monopoly.
Essential to solution of the problems was a clear idea of the word "monopoly" in the Act. The Board proceeded in its analysis:
In modern usage, most of the definitions suggested by the Courts fall into
two general categories, one of which defines the term "monopoly" as embracing any combination the tendency of which is to prevent competition in its
broad and general sense, and to control prices to the detriment of the public,
and the other holding that the word "monopoly" means the control of a
particular business or article of trade, without regard to the results which
may flow therefrom .... If the first definition of the word "monopoly" which
is essentially descriptive of a result, is applied to the proviso in section 408 (b),
the words immediately following, "and thereby restrain competition", would
be repetitious and of no effect since the definition by its terms includes the
factor of restraint of competition. On the other hand, if the second definition,
which treats "monopoly" as a condition embodying a particular degree of
control, is applied, the remaining words of the proviso would have a definite
meaning and effect, since it would not be a foregone conclusion that such a
condition would restrain competition. It is a generally accepted rule of statutory construction that every word of a statute is to be given meaning, for it
cannot be assumed that particular words were used without some purpose. It
is concluded, therefore, that the word "monopoly" as used in the first proviso

of section 408 (b), refers to a particular degree of control of air transportation, or any phase thereof, in any territory or section of the country. It follows
that restraint of competition is a factor, insofar as the application of the
which the
proviso is concerned, only if it results from the degree of control
9
Authority decides constitutes a monopoly of air transportation."
The Board thus decided that the absence of punctuation in the proviso
compelled the conclusion that jeopardy to an air carrier, like restraint of
competition, is a factor to be considered only if brought about by monopoly.' The Board concluded its analysis by saying: "In deciding upon the
application of the proviso in section 408 (b) to the agreement, therefore,
it is necessary to determine whether it will result in giving one of the
parties the degree of control of air transportation, or some phase thereof,
within a particular section of the country, necessary to constitute a

monopoly therein.''.
The foregoing analysis has become somewhat academic in light of the
fact that the Board has never found that a proposed merger would violate
160Travers, An Examination of the CAB's Merger Policy, 15 KAN. L. REv. 228, 247 (1967).
167 United Air Lines Transport Corporation and Western Air Express Corporation-Interchange
of Equipment, 1 C.A.A. 723, 732-34 (1940).

...d. at 732.

1091d. at 733-34.
0
17 Id. at 734.
171Id.
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the antimonopoly proviso. ' Furthermore, the CAB has failed to elaborate
upon what type of merger violates the antimonopoly proviso and has
thereby failed to develop standards to aid in the application of the proviso.
Consequently, the Board has tossed off the antimonopoly proviso in a somewhat perfunctory manner, in local service merger cases, seeming to treat
it as some vague form of overall or partial monopoly. In the MonarchChallenge Merger Case the Board merely noted that there was no evidence
that the proposed merger would result in a monopoly. " 3 In the ArizonaMonarch Merger Case the Board adopted the examiner's opinion that the
acquisition would not result in the elimination of any competing carrier
and therefore the issue of monopoly was not present. 7 4 In the West-CoastEmpire Merger Case the Board again noted only that the merger would not
result in a monopoly." 5 The Board did not attempt to further refine the
meaning of the word monopoly and nowhere did it attempt to decide what
percentage share of a city pair market or series of markets would constitute
a monopoly by the local carrier involved. The very nature of the local
service operation seems to favor route monopolies due to the high costs
involved in providing service on the local, typically low density, routes.
Therefore, it would seem to follow, that a consideration of route monopoly
is much less important in local service mergers than it is in trunkline
mergers since the Board would likely tolerate a high degree of monopoly
on a typical local carrier system.
The conclusion follows that regarding proposed local service mergers
the Board pays lip service only to the antimonopoly proviso. Without a
cursory reference to even the vaguest of standards the Board will determine that the merger will not result in a monopoly. It must follow that
little significance attaches to the antimonopoly proviso's role in Board
decisions of local service mergers. Hence it can be seen that the antimonopoly proviso is much broader than its language would seem to
suggest. It is capable of being sensitive to monopoly in trunkline cases but
tolerant of monopoly in local service carrier cases.
Having set out the statutory basis for local service carrier merger
decisions, attention can now be focused upon policy implementation in
the decisional process.
C. The Proposed Decisional Effectuation Of The CAB Policy Of Subsidy
Reduction Through Local Service Carrier Mergers
Two programs have been devised to implement the Board policy of
subsidy reduction of which the least precise, undoubtedly, is the program
of encouraging local service carrier mergers.' 6 Although lacking in precision by contrast with the carefully articulated system realignment program,
172

Travers, supra note 166, at 251, 256.

'"74 11 C.A.B. at 37.
1 Id. at 247, 271.
17 West Coast-Empire Merger Case, 15 C.A.B. 971, 976 (1952).
176 The Board has never carefully articulated a program of favoring local service carrier mergers
for the purpose of effecting its policy of subsidy reduction. The evidence, however, does suggest
the existence of a general Board policy of favoring local carrier mergers. To that extent a general
Board program can be said to exist.
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it nonetheless appears to be a general program designed to implement the
Board policy. The following treatment will advance the position that such
a program has indeed been developed. It will also explain its supporting
rationale.
I A brief consideration of the rationale promising the local carrier merger
encouragement program reveals the impact of such a program upon the
subsidy reduction policy. The purpose of subsidy reduction is clearly to
lessen the amount of subsidy required by local carriers. As stated by the
Board, the best way to reduce subsidy is by increasing earnings of the
carriers.'" The encouragement of local carrier mergers, within the broad
purview of the Federal Aviation Act,'78 will both increase earnings and
decrease expenses of the local carriers. Economies which the carriers achieve
upon merging arise both from increasing earnings, as a result of decreasing expenses, and from increasing revenues per se. The decrease in expenses
and consequent increase in earnings results in the main from the realization of economies of scale upon the consolidation of two or more airlines
and their facilities. The principal economies of scale realized are: economies
stemming from the establishment of longer stage lengths by the merged
airline which is then able to employ the more efficient turbofan jets to
provide service;... economies arising from the general efficiency of a
larger, better integrated route structure; 810 and, economies resulting from

the combined financial and physical resources of the merger carrier which
bring about a financially stronger carrier in turn more able to compete
effectively with both trunkline carriers and other local carriers, hopefully
preventing losses due to strong and resourceful competition. 8 ' Increases
in revenue of the per se variety, that is, occasioned by a direct gain in
revenue and not derived from a cost saving, generally result from gains
in passenger traffic facilitated by increased generation of passenger traffic
in general as well as through passenger traffic upon a larger route system.182
Since increased earnings can normally be expected to result in a direct
reduction of subsidy, it follows that an implementation program of encouraging local carrier mergers would assist in effectuating the policy of
subsidy reduction to the extent that increased revenues result.
If mergers of local carriers contribute to the financial improvements
necessary for subsidy reduction, has the CAB developed a program of
encouraging these mergers? The answer is in the affirmative. The founda177

Hearings on the Local Air Carrier Industry, supra note 3, at 33.

17'The Federal Aviation Act allows the CAB fairly broad discretion in deciding merger appli-

cations. The statutory requirements are examined in greater depth in Section IIB, supra.
1. AVIATION WEEK, Oct. 23, 1967, at 39.
lSSAMPRICAN AVIATION, Dec., 1967, at 45.
Is' AVIATION WEEK, supra note 179, at 39.
.8.Naturally the proportionate improvement in earnings position resulting from each of the
various economies or revenue gains effected in a merger of two (or more) local service carriers will
vary somewhat from merger to merger. Every type of economy and revenue gain is likely to be
effected in a merger to some degree because these are the only economies and revenue gains possible and tend to be present in any given merger. The degree of realization of each varies from merger
to merger as factual situations are never identical. Therefore, different types of unification of local
service carrier systems, whether "parallel" or "end-to-end," accomplished by merger, consolidation,
or acquisition, will have the same sources of economies and financial benefits although the degree
of realization of each will vary.
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tion for the CAB program of encouraging mergers was laid by Board
Chairman, C. S. Murphy, when testifying before the Aviation Subcommittee of the Committee on Commerce on February 28, 1966."'s After first
answering a question concerning the desirability of mergers, by stating
that local carrier mergers would be viewed with an open and sympathetic
mind, he added that the problems facing a particular area would also
carry much weight."' The Chairman also elaborated upon the circumstances calling for mergers:
In theory and in general terms it seems to me there might very well be
substantial economic advantages [to mergers]. But here again we need to keep
always before us the primary purpose of establishing this class of carriers to
provide local service to small- and medium-sized cities. And if mergers should
occur we would need to make sure it didn't take us away from that."
To date no contrary opinions of the Board or others have been expressed
although some opinions have appeared which would support a conclusion
that the Board has a program favoring mergers. A recent comment by
A. M. Andrews, director of the CAB's Bureau of Operating Rights,
expressed the view that of all actions affecting local carriers then before
the Board, "in significance [he] would place mergers at the head of the
list" ' because "of the reasonably available courses of action mergers
seem to contain some of the greatest long-term potentials for subsidy
reduction and improved public service...... The director's statement can
reasonably be regarded as indicating the Board's position on mergers.
The foregoing statements are strongly suggestive of a general CAB
policy favoring local carrier mergers in the interest of subsidy reduction.
What remains is the determination of whether this policy has been a
significant factor in the decisional process, or whether it has been forced
into the role of merely one of several competing considerations.
D. The Extent And Manner Of Decisional Effectuation Of The CAB
Policy Of Subsidy Reduction Through Local Service Carrier Mergers
1. The Method of Analysis
It has been demonstrated previously that the Board has adopted a policy
of subsidy reduction for local service carriers and appears to have adopted
a general program favoring local carrier mergers in order to carry out its
policy.' 8 The question must now be asked as to whether the proposed
means of effectuation has been applied in practice.
The method of analysis to be used in the determination of CAB policy
effectuation rests heavily upon a comparison of CAB decisions rendered
prior and subsequent to its policy and program of implementation. There181

Hearings on the Local Air Carrier Industry, supra note 3, at 27-68.

'14 d. at 50.
185

Id.

188 AVIATION WEEK, supra note 179, at 39.
187 id.
18 At the very least it can be said that the Board is predisposed in favor of local carrier mergers

as a means of effectuating the CAB subsidy reduction policy. See Section IIC, supra.
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fore it is necessary to determine the date of adoption of the CAB policy
and the date of formation of the program of policy implementation.
It was indicated previously that, although the Board had harbored a
vague notion that subsidy should somehow be reduced, it was not until
President Kennedy's Message to Congress that the CAB unequivocally
adopted a policy of subsidy reduction.' The date was April 5, 1962."'0
The general program of implementation of the CAB policy, that is,
favoring local carrier mergers, is not as easy to tie down. Its basic foundation appears to have been expounded by Board Chairman C. S. Murphy
on February 28, 1966.191 No prior mention of this general program appears
in CAB annual reports or elsewhere.19 In any event, no local carrier merger
applications were heard by the Board in the period extending from the
Board's adoption of a subsidy reduction policy on April 5, 1962, until
Chairman Murphy's reference to favoring local carrier mergers on February 28, 1966.3 There were, however, merger applications decided by the
1962.194
Board prior to its adoption of a subsidy reduction policy in April,
Thus, the actual date of the general program's nascence is not particularly
significant since it can be seen that no merger decisions were rendered by
the Board prior to that general program yet subsequent to the Board policy
of subsidy reduction. February 28, 1966 would seem a reasonable peg for
the implementation program's appearance.
Having determined the dates of adoption of the Board subsidy reduction policy and general implementation program the emphasis shifts to
the method of analysis to be applied to the Board's decisions prior and
subsequent to both policy and program. The analysis will be restricted for
the most part to local service merger decisions which will be grouped and
examined on the basis of similarity of geographical situation. Conveniently
each "prior" case has a recent analogue in the "subsequent" category. At
least one very recent application which the Board has not yet deciced will
also bear analysis.
The analysis will focus upon the various factors, or "variables," determinative of the consistency of merger applications with the public interest,
and, of less importance, the monopoly proviso. Critical to the analysis
will be the detection of an expected shift in emphasis from such factors
originally determinative of Board local service merger decisions as potential traffic diversion, trunkline character of the resulting system and relationship, or lack of it, between the areas served by the applicants, to other
factors relating to economy and efficiency as a necessary basis for implementing the Board policy and program. An examination in depth of the
Board's articulated reasons as well as any unarticulated premises will be
necessary in analysing the relevant decisions.
...See Section I, supra.
190Id.
...Hearings on the Local Air Carrier Industry, supra note 3, at 27-68.
192 See, e.g., C.A.B. Ann. Rep. 1960-66.
19

See Av. L. REP. 1 Feb. 1964 to 3 Oct. 1964; 2 Av. L. REP. 4 Oct. 1964 to 4 Mar. 1964.
194 See, e.g., North Central-Lake Central Acquisition Case, 25 C.A.B. 156 (1957).
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2. The Analysis
Three separate merger applications of local carriers providing air
transport on various parts of the west coast of the United States will be
considered first.5"' Two of the merger decisions were rendered prior to the
adoption of the subsidy reduction policy and the remaining one is yet to
be decided by the CAB although the hearing examiner has recommended
its approval to the Board.
The first significant local carrier merger 19 application before the Board
57
was the Southwest-West Coast Merger Case."
It also had trunkline overtones. The applicant Southwest flew three routes connecting Los Angeles,
San Francisco and Medford, Oregon. The applicant West Coast flew five
routes involving Portland, Seattle, Port Angeles, Bellingham and Medford.
The applicants' routes were contiguous at Medford.
In reaching its decision the Board weighed factors determinative of the
public interest but did not refer to the antimonopoly proviso. On the
favorable side the Board noted that the proposed merger would result in
an integration of physical properties and operations of the applicants
(although noting that little integration of traffic could result); that

annual savings and increased revenues would likely total $247,000;'

and,

that neither United nor Western, being the competitive trunk carriers on
the Pacific coast, would suffer serious traffic diversion as a result of the
merger. In spite of the potential advantages, the Board denied the proposed
merger as adverse to the public interest. Instrumental in the Board's
evaluation of the public interest were the factors that: the proposed merger
...The merger decisions examined herein are viewed in two groups based upon geographical
area of merger applicants' operations. It is thought that comparison is facilitated by viewing merger
applications in which the proposed surviving route systems cover the same or similar geographic
areas. Of course, the merger applications will still be examined primarily from the point of whether
they occurred prior or subsequent to the Board's subsidy reduction policy and general implementation program favoring local carrier mergers.
199 Two, less significant, merger applications of local service carriers were approved by the Board
prior to the Southwest-West Coast decision. The Board approved a merger between two small local
carriers, Monarch and Challenger, in 1949. Monarch-Challenger Merger Case, 11 C.A.B. 33 (1949).
The merged carrier was still very small, serving only a portion of a five state area and having a
combined route mileage of approximately 4,000 miles, certainly not of trunkline character. Therefore, this merger is not of great relevance to this analysis. However, in this decision, the Board
stated that "among the principal factors" considered in determining whether a proposed merger is
in the public interest are whether a resulting system will be: integrated and coordinated; economical and efficient; and, not creative of monopoly. Id. at 35. In any event, the major considerations of the Board in the Monarch-Challenger merger decision are essentially the same as those of
the Board in the West Coast-Empire decision and would seem redundant to consider those factors
here. In 1950 the Board approved a merger between Monarch and Arizona. This merger decision was
somewhat unusual however since Arizona, although certificated for one and one half years, had not
commenced operations, primarily because of financial problems. The Board required Monarch to
demonstrate financial resources sufficient to inaugurate and operate service on the acquired routes
before commencing service. It was in view of the absence of local service on Arizona's system that
the Board approved the Monarch-Arizona merger. Arizona-Monarch Merger Case, 11 C.A.B. 246,
252 (1950). Since the absence of service was a significant factor in the Board's decision the decision is anomalous for the purposes of this analysis. This is because it is not possible to determine
the extent of motivation provided the Board by its desire to see local service initiated on existing
certificated routes.
' Southwest-West Coast Merger Case, 14 C.A.B. 356 (1951). All factual statements recited
pursuant to the case in the text of this paper are drawn from discussion in the case itself at 356-61.
...The Board did not consider what portion of the $247,000 would be likely to result in subsidy reduction for the merged carrier. Neither the Board nor the hearing examiner mentioned the
potential effect of a competitive third carrier with trunkline character upon United's and Western's respective subsidy positions. Id. at 356-73.
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would tie together the San Francisco-Los Angeles and Seattle-Portland
areas which are not essentially related trade areas; the routes of the applicants would be fused into a huge single system running the length of the
Pacific coast in the trunkline tradition (as did United's and Western's
systems) and, though not penetrating the United and Western long haul
market, would still pose a competitive threat to the trunks by virtue of its
availability to transport passengers for practically any length along the
Pacific coast. This potential competition was especially threatening to
Western, by far the weaker of the two trunk carriers, whose Pacific coast
routes constituted the backbone of its system. The Board added that:
"[w]hile we do not share the concern of [United and Western] with the
possibility of the merged carrier assuming trunkline characteristics, yet
by retaining the Board's original policy of confining local carriers to
particular areas, the Board will not only maintain its own policy but will
'
remove the fear expressed by the trunklines in this case."199
In reaching its decision the Board weighed all factors deemed consistent
and inconsistent with the public interest and decided that the merger
would result in an "undesirable change in the air route pattern." ' The
Board did not discuss the question of potential subsidy reduction resulting
from the merger. It did, however, note that the unification would improve
the profit and loss position of the merged carrier by $247,000. However, it
is not possible to determine what portion of this gain, if any, the Board
expected to flow through to reduce subsidy. Although the Board noted
that the merged carrier would have a trunkline character and would compete to some extent with the existing trunkline carriers in the area, it did
not elaborate on the degree of competition which would be provided. The
Board did not comment upon the significance of the resulting trunkline
character of the merged carrier other than to note that it could result in
some competition for the existing trunklines and that it was the Board's
original policy to confine local carriers to particular areas. This is not sufficient commentary to determine the precise role which resulting trunkline
character played in the Board decision.
In the Southwest-West Coast decision it appears that when faced with
a choice between the realization of a financial improvement of the order
of $247,000 annually and the degree of resulting new trunkline competition (however intense it might be) as well as the connection of essentially
unrelated trade areas, °5 the resulting trunkline character, and the poor
traffic integration, the Board gave precedence to the latter considerations.
The latter factors are the controlling variables in the Board's decision.
Subsidy reduction does not appear to have a controlling variable 212 in the
199Id. at 358. The Board did not say that it was unconcerned with the trunkline character of
the survivor which would result from the merger, however. It said: "we cannot lose sight of the
fact that the merger would convert the routes of the two local service carriers into a single system
extending over substantially the entire length of the Pacific Coast. It would enable the merged
company to provide one carrier, one plane service between the large traffic centers, Seattle-Portland,
San Francisco and Los Angeles." Id. at 357.
'00Id. at 357.
It appears that the connection of unrelated trade areas, is for the most part, not bad per se
but simply represents an absence of affirmative benefit.
25 Diversion and monopoly likewise do not appear to be controlling variables in the Board's
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decision since the Board did not mention it, or examine it, which it surely
would have done had it been a significant consideration. Nor can the
examination by the Board of potential financial improvement be presumed
to refer directly to subsidy reduction. Therefore, it can be concluded that
potential subsidy reduction has not played a significant role in SouthwestWest Coast, other variables controlling the Board's decision.
The Board did not enunciate any guidelines for determining an "essential relationship" between trade areas. It did, however, set forth some
criteria for assessing the trunkline character of an air carrier, notably,
whether the merged carrier possessed a large route system covering a large
geographic area and provided one carrier-one plant service between the
large traffic centers. The precise evaluation of trunkline character, as will
subsequently be seen, is rarely possible upon resort to Board criteria.
The Board suggested as well in the Southwest-West Coast Merger Case,
that contiguous trade areas might provide a more fertile field for mergers
than areas of only scant relationship. While expressly denying that this
fact premised the decision in any way, the Board suggested that such
potential unifications as West Coast-Empire and Southwest-Bonanza presented interesting possibilities."' This statement by the Board appears to
be a significant policy revelation indicating that (apart from subsidy
reduction) the Board favors only the connection of contiguous trade
areas in local carrier mergers. The context of the statement and the very
nature of the route systems which would result from the suggested
mergers, however, are strongly suggestive that while the Board was interested in improving local carriers' economies and earnings through mergers
(and potentially subsidy reduction as well), it was only interested if a
carrier of trunkline character did not result and contiguous trade areas
were connected. While the Board did not mention diversion, monopoly, or
quality of route integration, it would seem reasonable that the Board would
consider such factors, especially if present in adverse capacity, in local
carrier merger applications. It can be concluded, then, that at this time the
Board was not opposed to local carrier mergers per se but was interested in
using them to improve the financial position of local carriers if circumstances were favorable.
Less than one year from its denial of the Southwest-West Coast merger
the Board considered the West Coast-Empire Merger Case which had been
so intriguing the previous year."' West Coast, as already noted, flew routes
in western Washington and Oregon. Empire serviced eastern Washington
and Oregon, and northern Idaho.
decision. The former was not present in sufficient force to block the merger, the latter was not
even mentioned by the Board.
...The Board stated: "Although we do not rest our decision upon this fact, it should be noted
that there are other areas available to the applicants for exploring the possibility of mergers in
contiguous trade areas. For example, West Coast and Empire present interesting possibilities for
merger. Similarly, Southwest and Bonanza may find it to their advantage to consider a merger,
and it might well be that such mergers would result in equivalent if not greater savings than appear possible in the proposed West Coast-Southwest merger." 14 C.A.B. at 358.
24West Coast-Empire Merger Case, 15 C.A.B. 971 (1952). All relevant factual statements
recited in the text of this paper pursuant to this case are drawn from discussion in the case itself
at 972-92.
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In reaching its decision the Board noted several factors determinative
of the public interest, almost all of them favorable to a merger of the
applicants. The Board, while not mentioning subsidy reduction, observed
that the merger would result in annual savings of $164,000, and would
also generate approximately 2 million more passenger miles annually. The
proposed purchase price was found reasonable."' No monopoly would
result."' The only negative factor was the possibility of slight diversion
of traffic from United. The Board did not mention that the merged carrier
would a) join continuous trade areas in the Pacific northwest (favored
by the Board in the Southwest-West Coast Merger Case) and, b) that the
new carrier would not have the character of a trunkline but would remain
a local carrier in form and function serving a fairly small area of the
country."' The Board approved the merger on June 27, 1952.
The significance of the West Coast-Empire decision lies principally in its
material differences with the Southwest-West Coast decision. There were
two related significant differences: the West Coast-Empire merger connected contiguous trade areas and did not give rise to a system of trunkline
character. 8' It follows that the West Coast-Empire merger was approved
because of its potential financial benefits, its resulting conection of two
contiguous related trade areas, and its retention of a local service character.
Therefore, the significant differences which led to the approval of the
West Coast-Empire application and denial of the Southwest-West Coast
application must have been the resulting trunkline character and connection of unrelated trade areas in the Southwest-West Coast merger application.
Such factors as reasonable price, minimal diversion of traffic, and no
" Purchase price refers to the price of acquired assets in an acquisition. In the case of a conventional merger, "price" becomes a formula to determine relative ownership participation by the
two groups of shareholders in the merged enterprise. Southwest-West Coast Merger Case, 14 C.A.B.
356, 373 (1951). In the West Coast-Empire Case, West Coast sought to unite with Empire by a
purchase of all outstanding Empire stock. The Board termed this a merger. West Coast-Empire
Merger Case, 15 C.A.B. 971 at 971 (1952).
20 1 C.A.B. at 992.
2.7By the Board's own criteria (as set out in the Southwest-West Coast Merger Case) the surviving carrier would not cover a large geographical area, at least not nearly as large as the proposed Southwest-West Coast merged system. It would not provide one-plane-one-carrier service
between any large traffic centers except perhaps Seattle and Spokane. 1952 C.A.B. Ann. Rep., Appendix III. Therefore the West Coast-Empire merger should not result in a surviving system of
trunkline character. However, the Board has not developed entirely satisfactory criteria for determining resulting trunkline character when local carriers merge. (The basic criteria of local
carrier character, set out in the Piedmont Certificate Renewal Case, 15 C.A.B. 736, 810 (1952),
are helpful in stressing the short-haul, multistop, compulsory stop nature of a local carrier system.
West Coast-Empire retains this nature. Like other local carriers it is confined to one particular region of the country-the Pacific Northwest. Thus the merged carrier appears much less a trunk
and much more a local carrier.) (Note: The merged carrier, West Coast-Empire, would also be
unlikely to satisfy the trunkline criteria later set out in North Central-Lake Central, namely:
substantial route mileage; large number of cities served; density of population and substantial geographical area covered. North Central-Lake Central, 25 C.A.B. at 159.). The Board has not clarified
the meaning of "contiguous trade area" but a reasonable interpretation would seem to rely heavily
upon geographical proximity of population and trade centers. On this basis, a West Coast-Empire
merger would connect areas in western and eastern Washington which appear to be the most proximate, populated areas. [Furthermore, the Board stated that these areas were contiguous in the
Southwest-West Coast Case, 14 C.A.B. 356, 3"58- (1951).] It appears then, that the areas are contiguous.
208See supra note 207. The estimated finincial improvement in each merger was of approximately the same order.
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resulting monopoly, though stated as reasons for decision must be discounted as true premises of decision because they are essentially negative
factors. If present in an adverse capacity, for example, unreasonable price,
resulting monopoly, or substantial diversion of traffic, they will likely
compel a denial of merger application. But if present in a favorable
capacity, the effect is only to turn the Board's attention to more crucial
issues.
The point of the above analysis is that in the West Coast-Empire merger
the controlling variable was potential financial improvement, a positive
factor, with no significant adverse negative factors being present. Conversely, in the Southwest-West Coast merger a positive factor, financial
improvement, was outweighed by the negative factors of resulting trunkline character of the unified carrier, connection of unrelated trade areas,
poor route integration, and resulting new trunkline competition. It follows
that local mergers were not used at this time permanently as a source of
subsidy reduction. The overriding consideration was the maintenance of
the locals' character and not their need for financial improvement.200
The foregoing analysis suggests that, barring any change in Board
policy, a merger resulting in local carrier financial improvement would be
denied if it resulted in the surviving carrier's assumption of a trunkline
character and connection of unrelated trade areas. However, as previously
indicated, the Board did change policy by adopting a policy of subsidy
reduction for local carriers in April 1962 and developed a general program
of policy implementation by encouraging mergers of local service carriers.
If the Board really sought to effectuate its policy of subsidy reduction it
would be expected that when faced with an application for merger in
which the primary considerations were a substantial financial improvement (and potential subsidy reduction) versus an assumption of trunkline character and connection of unrelated trade areas by the surviving
carrier, the Board would approve the merger in order to realize a subsidy
reduction. The Board has recently decided just such an application by
three west coast local carriers.
A merger application which would merge Pacific, West Coast and
Bonanza into one huge western system known as Air West has been approved by the Board. The proposed merger is very similar to the Southwest-West Coast merger denied by the CAB in 1951, Southwest having
changed its name to Pacific"'0 in the interim. One substantial difference,
however, is the inclusion of Bonanza.
Pacific and West Coast still fly routes in the Los Angeles-San Francisco
and Seattle-Portland-Spokane areas respectively.21 Bonanza's routes are
contiguous with Pacific at Los Angeles and Las Vegas, with West Coast
at Salt Lake City. The Air West system will serve an area bounded by
Canada, the Pacific Ocean, Mexico, and Salt Lake City. If the proposed
Southwest-West Coast merger would result in a trunkline character for
Cases to the contrary are examined infra.
Hearings on the Local Air Carrier Induatry1, supra note 3, at 300.
"' Id. See map between pages 126-27.

209

210See
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the survivor, the Bonanza-Pacific-West Coast merger would result in a
trunkline character to an even greater degree. Similarly, if the proposed
Southwest-West Coast merger would have connected unrelated trade
areas, so would the proposed Bonanza-Pacific-West Coast merger since the
same areas, as well as some new ones, have been connected.
Despite the trunkline character of Air West and its connection of
unrelated trade areas, the merger application was approved by CAB
examiner"' Ralph Wiser on the ground that new service, substantial
economies and subsidy reduction (of the order of $400,000 annually"'2 )
would result. The examiner also noted that no monopoly and only slight
diversion would result. The Board in approving the application found
itself in substantial agreement with its examiner. 14 It reconsidered in
depth only the use of the name "Air West" and the total amount of
anticipated subsidy reduction.
In reaching its decision the Board found that the merger would improve
service, not create a monopoly, have no substantial adverse effect on other
carriers, and reduce subsidy, not by the $396,000 estimated by the
examiner, but by $676,000 per annum. The Board concluded: "In light of
the immediate subsidy reduction of $676,000 per annum, the additional
long term economies . . .and the other substantial benefits of the merger
enumerated in the recommended decision, the proposed merger is clearly
consistent with the public interest. . . Itseems clear that the controlling
variables in the decision were subsidy reduction and improvement of
service by the merged carrier.
The decision was based partly upon anticipated new service resulting
from the unification. New service, however, is bound to result from any
merger of carriers with contiguous route systems since one carrier-one
plane service becomes possible over longer route segments. More efficient
scheduling and plane utilization is possible. Subsidy reduction, on the
other hand, is not the inevitable consequence of a merger because a merger
does not automatically improve earnings. Of direct significance, however,
the Board did not note the extent of service improvement but saw fit to
specify, in some detail, the extent of potential subsidy reduction."' It
follows that the Board regarded subsidy reduction as the most important
consideration in its decision.
Subsidy reduction was the most important controlling variable in the
Bonanza-Pacific-West Coast decision. It is clear, therefore, that subsidy
reduction has had a significant impact upon the Board's decision.
Because the Board did not indicate the role of its subsidy reduction
212 Bonanza Air Lines, Inc., Pacific Air Lines, Inc., West Coast Airlines, Inc., Merger Agreement,Docket No. 18996 (C.A.B. Examiner's Decision, 4 Jan. 1968). The examiner stated: "The
matters set forth above lead to the conclusion that approval of the proposed merger, subject to appropriate conditions, will be in the public interest. A considerable amount of new and improved
service and substantial economies and reduction in subsidy can be expected. No substantial adverse

effects on other carriers are involved .... " Id. at 19.
213id. at 6, 7.
214Bonanza-Pacific-West

Coast Merger Case, Docket No. 18996

(Order Nos. E-26625 and

E-26626) 2 Av. L. Ri'. 3 21,795 (23 Feb. 1968, approved by the President, 4 April 1968).
215Id.

ale Id.
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policy in this decision, and because subsidy reduction was not the only
controlling variable in the decision, it cannot be definitely concluded that
the Board's subsidy reduction policy was a material influence in this
decision. The Bonanza-Pacific-West Coast decision was very similar to the
Southwest-West Coast application in that both mergers would connect
unrelated trade areas and result in a merged carrier of trunkline character.
However, these decisions differed in that subsidy reduction and improvement of service were controlling variables in the Bonanza-Pacific-West
Coast decision but were not in the Southwest-West Coast decision.
Because subsidy reduction was the major controlling variable in the
Bonanza-Pacific-West Coast case, because resulting trunkline character
and the connection of unrelated trade areas were not controlling variables
as they were in the very similar Southwest-West Coast decision (and might
well have been in this decision) and because this case was decided subsequent to the Board's adoption of its subsidy reduction policy, the conclusion is strongly suggested that the Board's subsidy reduction policy did
have a material effect upon the Board's decision in the Bonanza-PacificWest Coast case."' For the reasons previously noted, however, the suggested materiality cannot be said to be conclusive.
The second group of local carrier mergers to be considered comprises
three similar merger applications between inland carriers of the western,
central and eastern United States. Only one merger decision in this group
of applications was rendered prior to the adoption of the Board policy of
subsidy reduction in April, 1962. That decision was given in the North
Central-Lake Central Acquisition Case... of 1957 and involved local carriers in the central states.
North Central, the proposed acquisitor, provided service primarily
north of Chicago in Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and North
Dakota. Its system was contiguous with Lake Central's at Chicago. Lake
Central provided service south of Chicago primarily in Ohio and Indiana.
In reaching a decision the Board found that approval would result in
substantial subsidy savings from elimination of duplicating facilities,
operations, and personnel. The examiner had estimated subsidy savings
at $400,000 annually, but the Board would only indicate that such saving
would be "sizeable." However, the Board also found that the merger
would result in the connection of trade areas which were substantially
unrelated, making for poor integration, and also give rise to a system of
trunkline character as measured by route mileage, cities served, popula27 It is difficult to compare the estimated financial benefit of $247,000 in the Southwest-West
Coast case to the estimated annual subsidy reduction of $676,000 in the Bonanza-Pacific-West Coast
because there is no way of determining what portion of the $247,000 financial benefit would flow
through to subsidy reduction. However the Board did not deal at length with the amount of
financial benefit in the former case whereas it did deal at some length with the quantum of subsidy
reduction in the latter case. This is suggestive, but not conclusive, that quantum of subsidy reduction was somewhat material in the latter decision.
8

"' North Central-Lake Central Acquisition Case, 25 C.A.B. 156 (1957), aff'd sub nom. North
Central Airlines v. CAB, 265 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 903 (1959). All relevant
factual statements recited in the text of this paper pursuant to this case are drawn from the discussion in the case itself at 159-69. Although referred to as a "merger" this proposed unification
was actually an acquisition wherein North Central sought to acquire Lake Central. Id. at 156.
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tion density and geographical area covered, 19 thereby posing the kind of
competitive threat to trunklines which concerned the Board in the Southwest-West Coast decision. The Board in denying the application stated that
subsidy reduction is only one factor to be considered in assessing the effect
on the public interest of the proposed merger and on balance it is out-

weighed2 . by the adverse factors present in the case.

The stated considerations supporting the merger denial are very similar
to those expressed in the Southwest-West Coast merger decision previously
examined. In the North Central-Lake Central case, when faced with a
choice between "substantial" subsidy reduction .21 (not mere financial
improvement as in Southwest-West Coast )and resulting trunkline character of the merged carrier with concomitant potential new trunkline
competition, the connection of substantially unrelated trade areas and poor
route integration, the Board gave precedence to the latter considerations.
They were the controlling variables in the decision. Therefore, it can be
concluded that, prior to the Board's adoption of its subsidy reduction
policy, the goal of subsidy reduction was not sufficient to offset the disadvantages of creating a merged carrier of trunkline character, which
connected unrelated trade areas, and resulted in poor route integration.
Because subsidy reduction was not a controlling variable it appears that
it did not exert a material influence upon the Board's decision even though
it was of a substantial nature.
In contrast to the North Central-Lake Central merger decision is a very
recent Board merger decision, the Frontier-CentralMerger decided September 1, 1967.22 Frontier provides local service in the west and midwest,
primarily in Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, New Mexico, and Nebraska."
Central flies routes in the southwest, primarily in Kansas, Oklahoma, and
2 2
Texas.2 ' Their routes are contiguous at both Denver and Kansas City.
On its face, the merger is very similar to the North Central-Lake Central
application denied previously by the Board, in that the surviving carrier
would possess the character of a trunkline by the Board's own criteria."u
219ld. at 159.

"Old. at 162.
221 The Board adopted the examiner's $400,000 per annum figure, arguendo, in its consideration.
(Neither monopoly nor diversion were mentioned by the Board in this decision.)
222Frontier-Central Merger, Docket No. 18517 (Order No. E-25626) (1 Sept. 1957); 2 Av.
L. REP. 5 21,741.01. Unlike the geographical group of Pacific coast carriers which flew primarily
North and South, the carriers in the "inland" geographical group operated "net" type systems
which, although contiguous in the various applications, provided service in practically every direction. The distinction between the geographical groups is not of great significance but facilitates

a consideration of the various merger applications. (Pacific group carriers: West Coast, Pacific neo
Southwest, Bonanza, Empire; inland group carriers: North Central, Lake Central, Central, Frontier,
Allegheny.)
223 Hearings on the Local Air Carrier Industry, supra note 3, at 126-27.
224 Id.
22 Id.
2eThe Board criteria were set out in the North Central-Lake Central Acquisition, 25 C.A.B.
at 159. The factors which the Board assesses in determining whether a merged carrier (from two or
more local carriers) has a trunkline character are: route mileage, number of cities served, density
of population and geographical area covered. The proposed new Frontier-Central system would have
combined route mileage of approximately 14,000 miles, serve 100 points and cover a 14 state area.
1966 C.A.B. Ann. Rep. at 82; 1965 C.A.B. Ann. Rep. at Map No. 2. By contrast, the North Central-Lake Central proposed merger of 1957 would have a combined route mileage of approximately
9,000, serve 93 points, and cover a 12 state area. 1959 C.A.B. Ann. Rep. at 53 and Map No. 2.
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Also, it is difficult to see how the trade areas connected would be more
than distantly related when considering the Board's own vague pronouncements on that subject. The Board requires a showing that substantial traffic
will flow beyond the connecting point of the merger applicants' route
systems to demonstrate a relationship between trade areas. In the North
Central-Lake Central case the Board found that it was "clear from the
record" that little traffic could be expected to flow between points on the
systems east and west of Chicago but "as experience shows" traffic would
tend to stop in Chicago. 27 The situation in the Frontier-Centralcase seems

similar. Traffic would seem much more likely to stop in Denver or Kansas
City, the connecting points of the route systems, than flow through these
points between the western Colorado, Montana, Wyoming, Nebraska
system and the southwestern Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas system. It

follows that the degree of relationship between the connecting trade areas
would likely be slight.
On September 1, 1967 the Board approved the Frontier-CentralMerger.2 8 In so doing the Board did not mention the resulting trunkline
character of the merged carrier, Frontier, and offered no comment upon
the degree of relationship of the trade areas connected by the merger,"'
both factors important to the Board in the North Central-Lake Central

application." It seems likely that the Board chose to de-emphasize the
importance of these factors by remaining silent in that regard. The only
factor potentially negative to the public interest which the Board did
mention in the decision was possible traffic diversion from the Braniff, a
nearby trunk. 2 ' The Board held that the prime factors bearing upon the

public interest were the resulting additional through service and financial
improvement with corresponding decrease in subsidy requirements

(or

lower fares, or both) which would result from the merger.2 The Board
did not discuss the quantum of subsidy reduction which could be expected
to result. The Board did note that no restraint of competition or jeopardizing of another air carrier would result.
The controlling variables in the Frontier-Central decision were the
additional through service which would be provided and financial improvement in the merged carrier's position which, the Board noted, would
(1959 figures used). Population areas seem similar, both systems having large centers such as Denver, Ft. Worth-Dallas, Chicago, Indianapolis, and many smaller centers. It must be concluded, on
the basis of the Board's own criteria and the factual evidence, that the Frontier-Central system
has as much (or more) trunkline character as the Board found that the proposed North CentralLake Central system would have.
22725 C.A.B. at 158. Airline traffic of the local and feeder variety has a strong tendency to
leave the local carriers at larger centers as it is either being "fed" to the trunk carriers or is reaching the terminus of its journey.
228 Frontier-Central Merger, supra note 222.
229 The Board did not mention potential trunkline character for the merged carrier nor directly
the connection of unrelated trade areas. However, the Board statement that the public would be
benefited by the resulting through service would seem to imply that the Board believed the trade
areas were related to some degree.
22OFrontier-Central Merger, supra note 222.
21 Id. The Board stated: "[I]t cannot be concluded that any traffic diversion resulting from
the merger will have any substantial effect upon any other carrier .... " Braniff had indicated it
would suffer diversion but nevertheless did not object to the merger.
...Frontier-Central Merger, supra note 222.
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"inthe long run decrease the subsidy burden, or lower commercial fares,
or both.""5 Like the Southwest-West Coast and the North Central-Lake
Central proposed unifications, Frontier-Centralwould connect unrelated
trade areas and result in a carrier of trunkline character. 4 However, these
factors were not mentioned in the Frontier-Central decision and therefore were not controlling variables in the decision.
In seeking to determine whether the Board policy of subsidy reduction
has had any effect in the Frontier-Centraldecision, several observations
are required. In the first place it is not clear as to whether subsidy reduction was even a controlling variable in this decision. Because subsidy reduction logically accompanies an improvement in financial position, and
because it was specifically mentioned by the Board as a likely result of the
financial improvement, it is likely that it was considered by the Board
when it considered financial improvement. It is suggested, then, that
subsidy reduction was likely a controlling variable in the Board's decision.
If it was not, however, then it is clear that the subsidy reduction policy
could not have had any effect upon the decision. Second, the Board did
not elaborate upon the role played by the improved service controlling
variables, or its relation to financial benefit (and subsidy reduction) in
the decision. Thus it is not possible to know precisely what role financial
benefit (and subsidy reduction) played in the decision. Third, there were
various other controlling variables present in the Southwest-West Coast
and North Central-Lake Central decisions, such as potential trunkline
competition and poor route integration, which were not discussed in
Frontier-Central, so a direct comparison with these decisions and the
Frontier-Centraldecision is difficult. However, the Frontier-Centraldecision was rendered subsequent to the Board's subsidy reduction policy and
would result in financial benefit for the merged carrier and very likely
potential subsidy reduction as well. Furthermore, the merged carrier would
acquire a trunkline character and connect unrelated trade areas. The latter
variables were found controlling in merger decisions rendered prior to
the Board's adoption of a subsidy reduction policy but were not controlling in the Frontier-Centraldecision. Taken together these considerations
suggest that the Board subsidy reduction policy was in some way instrumental in the Board's decision.
Because the merger decisions have not involved identical factors, and
for the reasons above stated, however, it can only be suggested that the
subsidy reduction policy had some effect upon the Frontier-Central
decision. For the reasons noted the suggested materiality cannot be said
to be conclusive.
The third merger application in this second group of cases involved
Allegheny and Lake Central. Allegheny services northeastern states, primarily New York and Pennsylvania."' Lake Central's system is contiguous
Id.
""By the Board's own criteria set out in the North Central-Lake Central Acquisition, 25
C.A.B. at 159. See also note 99 supra. (The Board also found that the proposed Southwest-West
Coast system would have a trunkline character. Southwest-West Coast, 14 C.A.B. at 356-73.)
235Hearings on the Local Air Carrier Industry, supra note 3, at 126-27.
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at Pittsburgh and Detroit and services the area southwest of the Great

Lakes, primarily Ohio, Indiana, southern Michigan, and western Pennsylvania."' No decision has yet been rendered by the hearing examiner on this
application although this will be necessary before the Board hears and
decides the application. At present, the Allegheny-Lake Central merger
application has been approved by the shareholders of each carrier and the
Board's Bureau of Operating Rights." 7 The examiner's decision is pending&s
On the surface the Allegheny-Lake Central application appears to encompass many of the considerations of the various local carrier merger
decisions rendered previously. The various route systems involved suggest
strongly that, by the Board's own criteria,2" the merged carrier would take
on the character of a trunkline. The geographical characteristics of the
route systems involved suggest the possibility that unrelated trade areas
might be connected. It is likely that some form of financial benefits,
possibly leading to subsidy reduction, and some form of improved services,
will also be involved in this application. Because the Allegheny-Lake
Central application will in all likelihood involve many of the significant

considerations of the Southwest-West Coast, North Central-Lake Central,
Frontier-Centraland the Bonanza-Pacific-West Coast, its decision by the
Board will be of great importance. The Board decision will be able to
confirm the material effect of subsidy reduction in the Board's local carrier
merger decisions and either strengthen or weaken the suggested materiality
of the Board's subsidy reduction policy in those decisions.

E. Conclusions
In the first significant local carrier merger considered, the 1951 Southwest-West Coast decision, it was demonstrated that when faced with a
choice between a potential financial improvement of $247,000 annually
and the resulting trunkline character of the merged carrier, the degree of
resulting new trunkline competition, the connecting of unrelated trade
areas and poor traffic integration, the Board gave precedence to the latter
four factors. These factors were the controlling variables of the decision.
Subsidy reduction was not mentioned and the extent of potential new
trunkline competition was not examined by the Board. Because subsidy
reduction was not a controlling variable, it can fairly be said that it has
not had a discernible material effect upon the Board's decisions. The Board
236 Id.
237
28

Wall Street Journal, Mar. 15, 1968, at 13, Col. 8.
Wall Street Journal, Mar. 15, 1968, at 13, Col. 8. The function of the Bureau of Operating

Rights has varied over the years. Originally it was known as "public counsel" and its principal responsibility was to represent the public interest in proceedings before the Board. Subsequently it
acquired the job of preparing an adequate record for Board decisions and to this end the Bureau
requests evidence from the various parties to a proceeding. Lately the Bureau has concerned itself
deeply with the question of subsidy. When local service carrier proceedings involving merger, or
route certification applications arise, the Bureau almost invariably recommends action to the hearing
examiner and to the Board itself. The Bureau will favor action leading to subsidy reduction where
all factors are equal. Interview with Mr. S. Stroud of Mayer, Friedlich and Co., Attorneys At Law,
Chicago, 26 Apr. 1968.
"' See North Central-Lake Central Acquisition Case, 25 C.A.B. at 159.
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offered a policy revelation in the Southwest-West Coast case indicating
that it favored connecting only contiguous trade areas in local carrier
mergers and suggesting that West Coast-Empire and Southwest-Bonanza
presented interesting possibilities for merger. The import of this statement,
gathered from its context and the nature of the resulting merged system,
appeared to be that the Board was interested in improving local carriers'
economies and efficiencies through financial benefits resulting from local
carrier mergers-but only if a merged carrier of trunkline character did
not result and contiguous, related trade areas were connected. (And, of
course, where no other factors such as diversion, integration, and monopoly
were significantly adverse.)
In 1952 the Board approved the West Coast-Empire merger which
differed significantly from the Southwest-West Coast application only
in that the merged carrier lacked a trunkline character and it connected
contiguous trade areas. The merged carrier, therefore, would not be capable
of supplying additional trunkline competition for the existing trunk
carriers. The Board did not specifically mention route integration. The
Board found that the merged carrier would realize financial benefits
totalling $164,000 annually. Although the estimated financial improvement in West Coast-Empire was only about two-thirds as large as that in
Southwest-West Coast, the Board nevertheless approved the merger. In
the absence of the resulting trunkline character and connection of unrelated trade areas factors (and seemingly in the absence of poor route
integration), potential financial benefit had become the controlling variable
in the Board's decision. It can be concluded that the Board favored local

carrier mergers which would materially improve the financial position of
the merged carriers.

The important role played by the factors of resulting trunkline character and the connection of unrelated trade areas in local carrier mergers
can be seen in considering the Southwest-West Coast and West CoastEmpire decisions. Their absence from the favorable decision and presence
in the unfavorable one suggests that, at this time, they would be the
controlling variables of almost any decision in which they were significant
factors. Although financial benefit could lead to subsidy reduction, subsidy
reduction was not discussed in West Coast-Empire and was not a controlling variable of the decision.
In 1957 the Board denied the North Central-Lake Centralmerger application. The stated considerations of the Board decision did not differ greatly
from those of the Southwest-West Coast decision. The Board decided
against a merger which although it would reduce subsidy by $400,000
annually would also result in a merged carrier of trunkline character, connect unrelated trade areas and poorly integrate the applicants' routes. Substantial subsidy reduction had failed to become a controlling variable in the
decision in the presence of resulting trunkline character, connection of
unrelated trade areas, and poor route integration which were controlling variables of the decision.
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Upon considering the three early merger decisions, Southwest-West
Coast, West Coast-Empire and North Central-Lake Central, two conclusions emerge. Prior to the Board's adoption of its subsidy reduction policy
the Board favored financial improvement (and potential subsidy reduction) through local carrier mergers in the absence of such significant
factors as resulting trunkline character, connection of unrelated trade
areas, and sometimes poor integration of applicants' routes. However,
when faced with a choice between financial improvement, or even substantial subsidy reduction, and resulting trunkline character, connection of
unrelated trade areas, and poor route integration in a local carrier merger
application, the latter three variables were found by the Board to be
controlling. It can be concluded that substantial subsidy reduction, of the
order of $400,000 annually, did not have a material effect on the Board's
decision in the presence of the above controlling variables. It would seem,
then, that even substantial size of potential subsidy reduction would not
result in its having a material effect upon the Board's decision under such
circumstances.
In 1967 the Board approved the Frontier-Centralmerger application, a
very important decision. The factual contexts of Frontier-Central and
Southwest-West Coast and North Central-Lake Central were very similar.
A significant difference was that the former application was decided subsequent to the Board's adoption of its subsidy reduction policy while the
latter two applications were decided prior to it. Although the prior analysis
demonstrated that the merged carrier would connect unrelated trade areas,
and result in a merger carrier of trunkline character, the contolling variables in the Board's decision were additional through service and financial
improvement leading to subsidy reduction or lower fares or both. Neither
subsidy reduction, nor its quantum, were further discussed, so it is not
absolutely clear that subsidy reduction was a controlling variable in the
Board's decision, although this conclusion is suggested. Hence, the materiality of size of subsidy reduction cannot be determined. Because it appears
likely that subsidy reduction had some effect in the Board's decision (or
could have as a result of the anticipated financial improvement) and
because resulting trunkline character and the connection of unrelated trade
areas were not controlling variables, as they well might have been had the
application been decided prior to the Board's adoption of its subsidy
reduction policy, the conclusion is suggested that the subsidy reduction
policy had some effect upon the Frontier-Centraldecision. However, the
presence of additional service as the other controlling variable in the
decision, and the presence of other factors in the pre-policy decisions,
militate somewhat against the suggested conclusion.
In 1968 the Board approved the Bonanza-Pacific-West Coast merger.
The controlling variables of the decision were an estimated subsidy
reduction of $676,000 annually, and improved service. Subsidy reduction
was the dominant controlling variable. Although the factors of resulting
trunkline character and the connection of unrelated trade areas were
demonstrated by the analysis to be present, they were not controlling
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variables. Because substantial subsidy reduction was the dominant controlling variable it is clear that it had a discernible effect upon the Board's
decision. By contrast, in the very similar North Central-Lake Central
application, very substantial potential subsidy reduction (of the order of
$400,000 annually) did not have an effect upon the Board's decision.
Resulting trunkline character, connection of unrelated trade areas, and
poor route integration were the controlling variables. The only significant
difference between the decisions was the existence of the Board's subsidy
reduction policy prior to Bonanza-Pacific-West Coast but subsequent to
North Central-Lake Central. Thus, in a situation in which the only significant variable was the subsidy reduction policy, the variable resulted
in a decision change. Because of the effect of subsidy reduction on the
Board's decision and because the existence of the Board's subsidy reduction
policy was the only significant variable in Bonanza-Pacific-WestCoast and
North Central-Lake Central, the conclusion is strongly suggested that the
Board's subsidy reduction policy has had a material effect upon the Board's
decisional process. The materiality of the size of the potential subsidy
reduction in the decision is very difficult to assess because the Board did
not discuss this aspect of its decision. However, it would seem likely that
the dominance of subsidy reduction as a controlling variable would decline
with the size of the potential subsidy reduction.
A final merger application requesting the unification of Allegheny and
Lake Central has yet to be decided. This application will likely involve
many of the significant considerations examined previously in the prior
local carrier merger decisions. Its resolution by the Board will provide an
opportunity to confirm the material effect of subsidy reduction in the
Board's local carrier merger decisions and either strengthen or weaken the
suggested materiality of the Board's subsidy reduction policy in those
decisions.
The analysis of local carrier merger decisions, and conclusions drawn
therefrom, strongly suggests that the CAB policy of subsidy reduction
has had a discernible material effect upon CAB decisions in the merger
field. Thus far, however, the Board has acted subsequent to its policy of
subsidy reduction only in the Frontier-Centraland Bonanza-Pacific-West
Coast mergers. Whether such materiality will continue may be known
when the Board decision in Allegheny-Lake Central is handed down.

